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"When the Finance Committee began public
hearings on the Tax Reform Act of 1969 I referred
to the bill as '368 pages of bewildering complexity.'
It is now 585 pages .... Much of this complexity
stems from the many sophisticated ways wealthy
individuals-using the best advice that money can
buy-have found ways to shift their income from
high tax brackets to low ones, and in many
instances to make themselves completely tax free.
It takes complicated amendments to end
complicated devices." Senator Russell Long,
Chairman, Finance Committee'
I.

INTRODUCTION

From the turn of the twentieth century, Congress and the
states have uniformly granted tax exemption to charitable
foundations, and shortly thereafter tax deductions for charitable
donations. But an examination of state and federal debates and
corresponding
government reports,
from the War of
Independence to the 1969 private foundation reforms, clearly
shows that politically, America has been a house divided on the
issue of the charitable foundation tax exemption. By example, in
1863, the Treasury Department issued a ruling that exempted
charitable institutions from the federal income tax but the
following year, Congress rejected charitable tax exemption
legislation. However thirty years later, precisely as feared by its
1864 critics, the 1894 charitable tax exemption's enactment
carried on its coat tails a host of non-charitable associations, such
as mutual savings banks, mutual insurance associations, and
building and loan associations.
Yet, the political debate regarding exemption for the noncharitable associations did not nearly rise to the level expended
upon that for philanthropic, private foundations established by
industrialists for charitable purposes in the early part of the
century. But the twentieth century debate upon the foundation's
charitable exemption changed little from that posited between
the 1850s and 1870s by Presidents James Madison and Ulysses
Grant, political commentator James Parton, and Dr. Charles
Eliot, President of Harvard.
The private foundation tax
exemption evoked a populist fury, leading to numerous,
contentious, investigatory foundation reports from that of 1916

1.
115 Cong. Rec. 814, 944 (1969) (statement of The Hon. Russell B. Long),
reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2490.
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Commission of Industrial Relations, 1954 Reece Committee, 1960
Patman reports, and eventually the testimony and committee
reports for the 1969 tax reform. These reports uniformly alleged
widespread abuse of, and by, private foundations, including tax
avoidance, and economic and public policy control of the nation.
The private foundation sector sought refuge in the 1952 Cox
Committee, 1965 Treasury Report, and 1970 Petersen
Commission, which uncovered insignificant abuse, concluded
strong public benefit, though recommending modest regulation.
During the charitable exemption debates from 1915 to 1969,
Congress initiated and intermittently increased the charitable
income tax deduction while scaling back the extent of exemption
for both private and public foundations to the nineteenth century
norms. At first, the private foundation's lack of differentiation
from general public charities protected their insubstantially
regulated exemption. But in 1943, contemplating eliminating
the charitable exemption, Congress rather drove a wedge
between private and public charities. This wedge allowed the
private foundation's critics to enact a variety of discriminatory
rules, such as limiting its charitable deduction from that of public
charities, and eventually snowballed to become a significant
portion of the 1969 tax reform's 585 pages.
This article studies this American political debate on the
charitable tax exemption from 1864 to 1969, in particular, the
debate regarding philanthropic, private foundations.
The
article's premise is that the debate's core has little evolved since
that between the 1850s and 1870s. To create perspective, a short
brief of the modern economic significance of the foundation sector
follows. Thereafter, the article begins with a review of the preand post-colonial attitudes toward charitable institutions leading
up to the 1800s debates, illustrating the incongruity of American
policy regarding whether and to what extent to grant charities
tax exemption. The 1800s state debates are referenced and
correlated to parts of the 1900s federal debate to show the
similarity if not sameness of the arguments against and
justifications for exemption. The twentieth century legislative
examination primarily focuses upon the regulatory evolution for
foundations. Finally, the article concludes with a brief discussion
of the 1969 tax reform's changes to the foundation rules and the
significant twentieth century legislation regulating both public
and private foundations.
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II.

FRAMING THE STUDY: THE MODERN ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE FOUNDATION SECTOR

From 1995 to 2003, section 501 tax exempt foundations
increased from 1,065,378 to 1,308,583, with those filing form 990
rising from 347,525 to 457,329.2 This tax exempt sector is
composed primarily of "health service organizations (53.9%),
education and legal services (18.3%), social and legal services
(12%), and religious organizations (9.7%). "3 During this period,
gross receipts of these nonprofits grew from $1.12 trillion to
$1.87 trillion, and assets nearly doubled from $1.49 trillion to
over $2.67 trillion. In 1998, nonprofits employed nearly eleven
million full and part-time employees, accounting for 7.1% of the
national labor force. 4 As of 1995, non-religious nonprofits'
operating expenditures represented nearly 7% of GDP at just
over $500 billion.
From 1990 to 2002, contributions, gifts and grants increased
from $70 billion to $203 billion at the average rate of 9%
annually.' In 2002, individuals donated an estimated $183.7
billion, representing 76.3% of donations, followed by foundations7
at $26.9 billion (11.2%) and corporations at $12.19 billion (5.1%).
Of these donations, religious causes received 35% ($84.28 billion),
education
institutions
13.1%
($31.64
billion),
health
organizations 7.8% ($18.87 billion), human services 7.7% ($18.65
billion), arts related groups 5.1% ($12.22 billion), public policy
groups 4.8% ($11.6 billion), and environmental and animal
groups 2.7% ($6.59 billion).8 Approximately 21% of the donations

2.
National Center for Charitable Statistics ("NCCS"), available at http://
nccsdataweb.urban.org/tablewiz/tw-bmf.php (last visited Sep. 17, 2003). See also I.R.S.
Data Book 2000, I.R.S. Pub. 55B, 24 (2001).
3.
Nina J. Crimm, Shortcomings in U.S. Federal Tax Regulatory Regime of Private
Foundations:Insights for Australia, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 749, 779 (2002) (providing
statistics as of 1997).
4.
Crimm, supra note 3, at 778-79 (noting that a further 5.7 million full-time
volunteers represented an additional 3.7% of the labor force).
5.
Id. at 779.
6.
Figures and annual growth in average giving calculated according to Harvy
Lipman, Giving in 2002 Didn't Outpace Inflation, Report Says, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY,
June 2003, at 7 (calculated based on data from National Center for Charitable Statistics,
supra note 2 (quoting data from American Association of Fund-Raising Counsel Trust for
Philanthropy Fulfillment Department, Giving USA 2003, available at http://
www.givingusa.org.)) The total giving for individuals, corporations and foundation was
significantly higher at $241 billion. See Gerald Auten & David Joulfaian, Charitable
Contributionsand IntergenerationalTransfers, 59 J. PUB. ECON. 55 (1996) (stating that in
1992, individuals with itemized deductions contributed $60 billion to charity. Thus, the
figures of NCCS may be understated.).
7.
Calculated based on data from Lipman, supra note 6, at 7.
8.
See American Association of Fund-Raising Counsel Trust for Philanthropy
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($52.45 billion) went to either private foundations or were not
directed to a particular charity.9
III. 1536-1739: INHERITING ENGLAND'S SEE-SAW LEGISLATIVE
TREATMENT OF CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS

The English 1601 Statute of Charitable Uses is credited as
the historical origin of U.S. charity law. 0 However, in English
history leading up to the U.S. War of Independence, in particular
as regards land transfers, charitable institutions did not
generally enjoy the favor of government." Rather, the sovereign
viewed charities as means to deprive the government of revenue
through perpetually restricting land transfer. 2 Two hundred
years, from Henry VIII's voidance of charitable uses to obtain
revenue, Elizabeth I's charitable exception to Henry's legislation,
and Parliament's response to restrict application of Elizabeth's
response, exemplifies the struggle of early charitable
institutional policy inherited by the colonies.
In order to finance his reign, Henry VIII seized the Catholic
Church's and universities' lands and with parliament enacted3
The Statute of Uses in 1536 and The Chantries Act in 1545.
The Statute of Uses, in enacting the rule against perpetuities,
terminated the situation that most English land, in order to
escape feudal dues, was held from family generation to

Fulfillment Dep't, Giving USA 2003, available at http://www.gvingusa.org (stating in
1998 Americans donated more like 45% $76.06 billion of $172.52 billion, to religious
causes).
9.
Calculated based on data from Lipman, supra note 6, at 3.
10.
Tanya D. Marsh, A Dubious Distinction: Rethinking Tax Treatment of Private
Foundations and Public Charities, 22 VA. TAX REV. 137, 138 (2002); Lars G. Gustafsson,
The Definition of "Charitable"for Federal Income Tax Purposes: Defrocking the Old and
Suggesting Some New FundamentalAssumptions, 33 Hous. L. REV. 587, 609 (1996).
11.
See Evelyn Brody, CharitableEndowments and the Democratizationof Dynasty,
39 ARIZ. L. REV. 873, 899-906 (1997) (explaining that English law historically barred
devises for any charitable purpose). The earliest charitable institutions, circa 1200s1400s, primarily encompassed Catholic orders. Id.
Charitable institutions, such as
schools, hospitals, and churches were sometimes favored and funded by the Crown, but
also periodically fell out of favor, leading to escheat or redeployment of assets. See
NORMAN ALVEY, FROM CHARITY TO OXFAM: A SHORT HISTORY OF CHARITY LEGISLATION
21-22 (1995).
12.
See Brody, supra note 11, at 900-01. Uses, the precursor of trusts, were
employed by the property owning servants of the King, such as Knights and Lords, to
avoid feudal dues. Id. The Chancery recognized the use whereby a Knight could grant the
perpetual legal ownership of his land to a party (i.e., the church represented by the
bishop) but maintain the beneficial use for himself and future heirs. Id. Through the use,
legal title did not pass, avoiding attracting feudal transfer duties of the King and his
hierarchy. Id.
13.
Id. at 901, 909-10, 2911-13. Henry VIII was by no means the first king to
dissolve monasteries. Id. at 909.
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generation in dynastical, perpetual trusts owned by the Church. 415
The Chantries Act provided for escheat of colleges' possessions.
The government established as an organ of itself with tax-exempt
status by its sovereign
nature the Church of England, replacing
16
the Catholic Church.
See-sawing in favor of charitable institutions, under
Elizabeth I in 1597, parliament enacted a charitable corporation
act that exempted specified institutions from government
charges and the requirement of government consent when
formed for the following purposes:
to erect, found, and establish, one or more
hospitals, maison de Dieu, abiding places, or
houses of correction,... as well as for the finding,
sustentation, and relief of the maimed, poor, needy
or impotent people, as to set the poor to work, to
have continuance forever, and from time to time
place therein such head and members, and such
number of poor as to him,
his heirs and assigns
17
should seem convenient.
Furthering Elizabeth I's charitable incorporation statute by
suppressing the application of Henry's Statute of Uses and its
rule against perpetuities, four years later Parliament enacted the
Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, allowing real property
transfers to perpetual charitable trusts. 8 The Statute provided
for exemption from the Statute of Uses for a transfer to a charity
that provided:
relief of aged, impotent and poor people,...
maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers, schools
of learning, free schools, and scholars in
universities,... repair of bridges, ports, havens,
causeways, churches, sea-banks and highways,...
education and preferment of orphans,... relief,
stock or maintenance of houses of correction, ...
14.
Brody, supra note 11, at 901.
15.
Id. at 912-13.
16.
See Christine Roemhildt Moore, Comment, Religious Tax Exemption and The
"CharitableScrutiny" Test, 15 REG. U. L. REV. 295, 298-99 (2002-2003).
17.
See James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit CorporationLaw and an
Agenda for Reform, 34 EMORY L.J. 617, n.65 (1985).
18.
Gustafsson, supra note 10, at 605 (citing An Act to redress the Mis-employment
of Lands, Goods, and Stocks of Money heretofore given to Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz.,
ch. 4 (Eng.)); Brody, supra note 11, at 901.
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marriages of poor maids,... aid and help of young
tradesman, handicraftsman and persons decayed,
relief of prisoners,... aid of any poor inhabitants.9
However, during the late sixteenth century and seventeenth
century, the Crown often piecemeal interfered with religious
charitable trusts, either voiding the trust or employing cy pres to
divert the trust assets to the Crown's favored religion.20
Charitable institutions once again falling out of the Crown's
blanket favor, two hundred years after and in the same vein as
the Statute of Uses, Parliament revived a specific anti-charity
statute, The Mortmain Act, in 1736.21 The Mortmain Act of 1736
invalidated real property transfers to any charity mortis causa as
well as inter vivos transfers made one year or less before death.22
Though this statute limiting the funding of charities remained
English law until The Charities Act, 1960, Parliament modified it
in 1891 to allow for exceptions for devised property not to be used
for investment, thus endowment, purposes. 21
IV. 1776-1850: PERIOD OF POST-COLONIAL DISTRUST AND
GRADUAL ACCEPTANCE OF CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS

The Colonies inherited the English common law and its
history, but without the 1736 Mortmain Act.24 In addition to the
common law, the colonialists also inherited the English distrust
of perpetual land restriction, the power exercised by the Catholic
Church because of its substantial land holdings, and the distrust
of the Anglican Church because it was an organ of the English
government.2 5
During the early period after the War of
19.
Oliver A. Houck, With Charity For All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1422 (1984) (quoting
Charitable Uses Act, 1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 4).
20.
ALVEY, supra note 11, at 10-11.
21.
See Gustafsson, supra note 10, at 606, 649 n.62 (noting that Mortmain statutes
had previously been enacted in England but the Statute of Charitable Uses substantively
repealed them); see also Brody, supra note 11, at 903 (noting that Parliament's sentiments
for legislating the statute are uncertain, but may have been due to anticlerical feelings).
22.
ALVEY, supra note 11, at 11.
23.
Brody, supra note 11, at 905 n. 147 (noting that the statute was modified in 1891
to allow either the court or the Charity Commissioners to grant exception for a mortis
causa real property transfer to charity as long as the property was to be used for
charitable activity rather than for investment purposes).
24. Id. at 906.
25.
Id. After the revolution, the colonialists felt the same distrust for the Church of
England as that for Rome. See Fishman, supra note 17, at 624 (commenting on the
ongoing anti-charity-anti-clerical atmosphere of the post-colonial period); Note, The
Enforcement of Charitable Trusts in America: A History of Evolving Social Attitudes, 54
VA. L. REV. 436, 443-44 (1968) (same). This distrust of the Catholic Church reached into
the late nineteenth century, creating opponents of tax exemption for religious institutions.
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Independence, some states legislatures and courts exercised this
inherited distrust by voiding the establishment of charitable
trusts, denying the grant of charters for charitable corporations,
and constricting transfers to both.26
Seven states, being
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin, voided charitable trusts.2 7 In 1829, the
New York legislature enacted a form of the English Mortmain
law severely restricting devises to charity and codified a trust
law regime without the inclusion of the charitable trust, thus
severely restricting the likelihood a charitable gift would be
upheld. 8
By contrast, many states, in their constitutions and well as
by statute, borrowed from Elizabeth I's 1597 statute to protect
incorporation
for
charitable
purposes.29
Charitable
incorporations included
churches, charities,
educational
institutions, library companies, and fire companies. 0 The policy
behind the charitable statutes included promotion of freedom of
religion, easing legislative workloads, and easing of incorporation

See Stephen Diamond, "Of Budgets and Benevolence: Philanthropic Tax Exemptions in
Nineteenth Century America", 17 (Oct., 1991) (Address at the N.Y.U. School of Law,
Program on Philanthropy, Conference on Rationales for Federal Income Tax Exemption,
Oct. 1991), http://www.law.nyu.edu/ncpl/abtframe.html (last visited Jul. 9, 2003); see also
Erika King, Tax Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 49 SYRACUSE. L. REV. 971,
1037 n.8 (1999) (quoting James Madison's statement that "[t]here is an evil which ought
to be guarded [against] in the indefinite accumulation of property from the capacity of
holding it in perpetuity by ecclesiastical corporations.").
26.
See Brody, supra note 11, at 906-10; Fishman, supra note 17, at 623-25; John
Witte, Jr., Tax Exemption of Church Property:HistoricalAnomaly or Valid Constitutional
Practice?,64 S. CAL. L. REV. 363, 384-85 (1991).
27.
4 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 348.3 (3d ed. 1967). Some
states, such as Virginia in 1792, repealed the pre-independence English statutes,
including the Statute of Charitable Uses. The lack of the Statute of Charitable Uses
consequence, as argued by the States and agreed by the Supreme Court in Trustees of
Philadelphia Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Executors, 17 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1819), was that
charitable trusts without stated beneficiaries were void because of the lack of common law
precedent for establishing a trust without a beneficiary. Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation
of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable Organizations:A Theory of Risk
Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419, 427 (1998) (noting that this decision and ones
following it led to the establishment of charitable corporations instead of trusts to receive
donations).
28.
Brody, supra note 11, at 908; Fishman, supra note 17, at 627, 634. On page 634,
Professor Fishman notes that in 1840, New York enacted legislation allowing property
donations to incorporated colleges and other charitable institutions.
29.
Fishman, supra note 17, at 623 (noting that Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Vermont, and New Hampshire constitutionally protected charities).
30.
Fishman, supra note 17, at 631-32; see also Moore, supra note 16, at 299 (noting
that most new states had an established state church, which took over the former role of
the Church of England as an organ of the state, and that, after disestablishment from the
state, tax exemption continued as a matter of course).
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procedures.3
But not all states had charitable incorporation
statutes. Some states, such as Virginia, denied granting charters
to charitable corporations for several years.32 Of the states with
charitable incorporation statutes, all contained restrictions
regarding maximum income, expenditure for charitable purpose,
as well as reporting rules to guard against the accumulation of
property.
V.

1850-1860: UNIVERSAL PROPERTY TAXES CRYSTALLIZE THE
TAX EXEMPTION DEBATE

By the middle of the century, the Supreme Court of the
United States, by examination of the Statute of Charitable Uses
and common law applicable in the U.S., derived a broad
definition for charity. 4
The Court upheld contributions to
"charitable" institutions based upon the factors of the
institutions' public purpose and freedom from private gain. In
1860, upholding a devise and bequest for establishing two
education institutions, the Court stated "a charity is a gift to a
general public use, which extends to the rich, as well as to the
poor" and that "[aill property held for public purposes is held as a
charitable use, in the legal sense of the term charity."3 In 1877,
upholding a devise to an orphan's hospital, the Court presented
that:
A charitable use, where neither law nor public
policy forbids, may be applied to almost any thing
that tends to promote the well-doing and wellbeing of social man ....'Whatever is given for the
love of God, or the love of your neighbor, in the
catholic and universal sense,-given from these
motives and to these ends, free from the stain or
taint of every consideration that is personal,
private, or selfish.' 16
31.
See Fishman, supra note 17, at 632-33.
32.
See Witte, supra note 26, at 385; Brody, supra note 11, at 906-07; Nina J.
Crimm, A Case Study of a Private Foundation's Governance and Self-Interested
Fiduciaries Calls for Further Regulation, 50 EMORY L.J. 1093, 1099 (2001); Fishman,
supra note 17, at 631 n.70 (noting that corporate charters were granted to only 355
businesses during the eighteenth century).
33.
See Fishman, supra note 17, at 634; see also Brody, supra note 11, at 909 (noting
that a few state statutes still constrict the ability to devise to, or the holdings of,
charitable corporations).
34.
See Gustafsson, supra note 10, at 609-10.
35.
Perin v. Carey, 65 U.S. 465, 494, 506 (1860).
36.
See Gustaffson, supra note 10, at 610.
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Until the mid 1850s, many state statutes allowed
incorporation for charitable purposes but did not necessarily
exempt these corporations from state tax.37 Before the 1830s, the
states did not have a universal tax system and thus, while tax
exemption expressed government favoritism, it was not
practically significant.38
However, the 1830s enactment of
universal property tax regimes brought the issue of exemption to
the fore.3" During the remainder of the century, several states
enacted limited tax exemption for churches and educational
institutions. By example, many states exempted from property
tax the land upon which a church stood, but taxed the church's
income, including ministerial, rental, and endowment. 4' The
Massachusetts statutory tax exemption for religious, educational,
and charitable organizations, applying to Harvard University,
did not include an exemption for real estate or businesses held
for purposes of revenue. 41
Supporters and critics of exemption debated three primary
policies concerning the granting of limited tax exemption for
churches.
From a public policy perspective, the general
community felt that the church served as the communal
epicenter.
Church supporters also put forward that churches
provide the benefits of encouragement of personal morality,
public spiritedness, and democratic values.4 4 Critics countered
that from an equity standpoint, exemption inequitably expressed
state favoritism for religious groups over non-religious property
37.
For a historical summary of nineteenth century American policy regarding the
ad hoc to infrequent granting of tax exemption for charitable institutions, see Diamond,
supra note 25, at 12. For a description of colonial church exemptions and taxation of
certain income producing properties, see Witte, supra note 26, at 372-74.
38.
See Diamond, supra note 25, at 8-9.
39.
See id. at page 10; Witte., supra note 26, at 385-86.
40.
See Diamond, supra note 25, at 12.
41.
Id.
42.
CHAS. W. ELIOT, THE EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION OF CHURCH PROPERTY, AND
THE PROPERTY OF EDUCATIONAL, LITERARY AND CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS, APPENDIX TO
THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE EXPEDIENCY OF
REVISING OR AMENDING THE LAWS RELATED TO TAXATION AND EXEMPTION THEREFROM

367, 386 (1875) (stating that Harvard paid tax on its various business holdings in Boston,
save one specifically exempted from tax in its Charter).
43.
See Witte, supra note 26, at 374-75. The underpinnings of this public policy to
exempt the church drew from the historical exemption justified by two causes. Most
states had an official church established by government as an organ of the state
government, continuing the English tradition. Id. Second, the Churches acted as the
community services center of most townships, thus providing the local government
services that otherwise it should undertake. See id. at 375. This second justification
foreshadowed the government benefit analysis employed by Dr. Eliot. See infra Part
VI(C).
44.
John W. Whitehead, ChurchIState Symposium Tax Exemption and Churches:A
HistoricalAnd ConstitutionalAnalysis, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 521, 539-40 (1991-1992).
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owners.45 Also, exemption critic James Madison warned that the
accumulation of exempt Church property would eventually result
in religion influencing the political process."
Supporters provided a tax policy justification that the
limited exemptions applied only to the charitable institution's
property that produced insignificant income, such as cemeteries,
the church, the school, thus the exemption's revenue effect would
be slight.47 Critics responded that whereas both exempt and nonexempt persons used the state's services, only non-exempt
persons paid for them with resultant increased burdens upon
them.4 8 Supporters retorted to this argument of an inequitable
burden with a government benefit argument that the churches
provided public services, such as orphanages and soup kitchens,
not performed by non-exempt payers. 49
From an economic policy justification, supporters forwarded
that because many of these exempt institutions did not produce
much revenue, the tax could not be collected, leading to
unpopular land seizure. 0 Critics responded that the exemption
primarily benefited wealthy churches with valuable property and
significant income rather than the humble ones with low land
value and de minimis income.5 ' Again employing the subsidy
argument, supporters argued that all church income, regardless
of church size, went to provide charitable services, such as
religious activity and caring for the poor.52
VI. 1860-1870: To EXEMPT OR NOT TO EXEMPT? THE
CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE

Before the Civil War, federal revenues were generated
through customs and excise taxes on specific commodities.53 In

45.
Witte, supra note 26, at 381.
46.
Id. at 382. This criticism of exemption, reiterated by President Ulysses Grant,
most influenced the Walsh Commission's perspective on industrialists' foundations as
well as that of the Reece Commission. See infra Parts VIII, IX(D).
47.
See Diamond, supra note 25, at 14. In 1873, James Parton countered this
justification, alleging examples of such charitable institutions producing extraordinary
income. See infra Part VI.
48.
See Witte, supra note 26, at 381.
49.
Whitehead, supra note 44, at 540. Dr. Eliot further enunciated the government
benefit, also known as the tax subsidy, argument that the state ought to grant exemption
for the charitable provision of public service. See infra Part VI(C).
50.
See Diamond, supra note 25, at 14. In 1873, James Parton proffered a liberal
argument of land distribution efficiency that could only be achieved through such
unproductive property being seized and auctioned back into commerce. See infra Part VI.
51.
See Witte, supra note 26, at 382.
52.
See Whitehead, supra note 44, at 539-40.
53.
Id. at 541.
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many cases, Congress exempted churches and other charitable
institutions from the application of the tax.54 For example, in
1815 Congress exempted any "charitable, religious, or literary
institution" from the household furniture tax.
In 1863, the
Treasury Department issued an administrative ruling that "[t]he
income of literary, scientific, or other charitable institutions, in
the hands of trustees or others, is not subject to income tax," thus
exempting
them from the income tax imposed during the Civil
6
War.
In 1864, over the issue of extending tax exemption to
hospitals, the Senate debated whether to grant tax exemptions to
charitable institutions.57
A New York merchant, James
Roosevelt, bequeathed approximately one million dollars for the
establishment and endowment of a New York hospital. 8 This
endowment led New York Senator Edwin Morgan, Sr. to
introduce an amendment to exempt from tax all hospitals that
offered free medical care to sick or disabled U.S. war veterans in
order to encourage more such hospitals to be established by other
grants. 9
Maine Senator William Fessenden responded with the policy
decision of the Finance Committee: the granting of an exemption
for one type of socially beneficial institution would inevitably
burst the dam as every type of institution tried to squeeze
through the exemption crack.60 In this regard, he stated:
There are many cases in which it seems to be a
little hard to use the expression, to exact revenue;
but the same reasoning that applies to this
institution would apply to all eleemosynary
institutions which have capital invested, and yet, if
we undertake to make distinctions in connection

54.
See id. (noting early tax legislation exempting churches from excise taxes and
import duties).
55.
Id.
56.
Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax
Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L 585, 605 n.95 (1998); see also Diamond, supra note 25, at 15
(noting that the income tax was really an excise tax for the right to do business and thus
was not likely meant to apply to Churches and philanthropies).
57.
See Diamond, supra note 25, at 15-16.
58.
See CONG. GLOBE, 38"' Cong., 1st Sess. 2755 (1864); Diamond, supra note 25, at
15.
59.
See CONG. GLOBE 2755 (quoting Senator Morgan's statement that "[i]t would be
a little severe ... to have a tax imposed; and it has seemed to me to be very proper to
encourage others to found similar institutions by exempting them from taxation.").
Senator Morgan proposed the amendment to the Internal Revenue bill.
60.
See Diamond, supra note 25, at 15-16.
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with revenue, there is no knowing where we shall
stop ....
... to begin to make exceptions would lead to
infinite confusion; the amount would be very large
in the end; every effort would be made to bring
cases within the principle, if [sic] we tried to adopt
a principle in reference to it, and we thought it
entirely unsafe.
... that it would be entirely unsafe to begin a
system of exemptions anywhere, and that it is best
to leave all the property of the country to the
operation of the general law."'
Second, the Finance Committee addressed the critique that
an exemption is necessary to encourage charitable acts. It
concluded that the charitable citizen benefited from his own acts
because all charitable acts supported good government for the
benefit of all citizens, stating:
There is no danger that the tax imposed would
prevent any man from carrying out any good will
that he might have toward founding an institution
or aiding in support of an institution already
founded. The considerations that induce him to do
it are such that would not in any sense be affected
by the fact that his money thus invested did, like
all other money vested in the same way, aid in
supporting the government; .... It is all for the
benefit of the people, and the personal benefit to be
attained to the people is to provide them with good
Government and to support that Government. 2
Siding with the Finance Committee's reasoning, the Senate
rejected the amendment.63

61.
Id. at 2755-56. The 1894 income tax and corresponding debates produced the
exact result that the 1864 Congress sought to avoid, with different lobbies plying for
exemption for a variety of non-charitable associations, such as life insurance companies.
See infra Part VII.
62.
CONG. GLOBE 2755-56.
63.
Id. at 2756.
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A. 1870-1880: Parton,Eliot and the Massachusetts
Exemption Debate
Continued from the 1850s, in the 1870s the debate over
property tax exemption for charitable institutions, primarily
focusing on religious institutions, intensified.64 While most states
only exempted from tax land upon which the church actually sat,
several states considered, but did not pass, legislation to
eliminate all exemptions.
In 1874, Congress empowered the
District of Columbia to enact a property tax which the District
imposed on churches, but Congress repealed the tax five years
later.66
During this period, church tax exemption critics noted that
some churches were extraordinarily profitable thus well able to
afford a tax burden, by example, selling their urban land
profitably and relocating elsewhere, while other churches
produced significant income through pew renting.6 7 Exemption
supporters retorted that churches relocating from more valuable
property to less valuable outside of the town center should not
give rise to criticism.6 8 Also in justifying the income's exemption,
they argued that the profits were not of a commercial nature but
rather an ancillary one for supporting the churches' activities, in
some cases accounting for a substantial portion of a church's
income.
B. Parton'sCritique
In 1873, James Parton emerged as a chief critic of charitable
institutions, in particular the Catholic Church.0
Parton
forwarded both the populist and liberal arguments against
granting tax exemptions, establishing the basis of most twentieth
century arguments against the charitable exemption.7' President
64.
See Diamond, supra note 25, at 17.
65.
See id. at 18.
66.
Id. Churches applied for, and were granted, exemption on a case-by-case basis.
Id. However, the tax led to some churches defaulting, with consequent property seizures.
Id.
67.
See id. at 20, 31 (noting that Brooklyn's Plymouth Church rented its pews for
fifty thousand dollars annually).
68.
See ELIOT, supra note 42, at 387.
69.
See Diamond, supra note 25, at 20; see also ELIOT, supra note 42, at 386-87; see
infra Part VII(C).
70.
See Diamond, supra note 25, at 18-19. James Parton, 1822-1891, was a prolific
American nineteenth century biographer and political commentary writer. Id.
71.
See Diamond, supra note 25, at 28. The criticisms articulated by Parton, as well
as the responsive justifications by Dr. Eliot, replayed themselves in the 1916 Walsh
Committee (see infra Part IX), 1953 Cox Committee (see infra Part IX(C)), 1954 Reece
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Ulysses Grant and Parton, drawing from James Madison
concerns, warned that the inequitable concentration of untaxed
institutional, primarily church, wealth would threaten
democratic institutions, leading to political instability and
bloodshed.7 2
In 1875, President Grant, criticizing the vast
concentration of untaxed church wealth, stated:
So vast a sum, receiving all the protection and
benefits of government without bearing its portion
of the burdens and expenses of the same, will not
be looked upon acquiescently by those who have to
pay the taxes. In a growing country, where real
estate enhances so rapidly with time, as in the
United States, there is scarcely a limit to the
wealth that may be acquired by corporations,
religious or otherwise, if allowed to retain real
estate without taxation .... I would suggest the
taxation of all property equally, whether church or
corporation, exempting only the last resting place
of the dead and possibly, with proper restrictions,
church edifices.73
In the populist vein, Parton alleged that the wealthy
churches
abused
their
exemptions
through
building
extraordinarily luxurious club houses for their rich congregations
to socialize rather than employing their wealth for charitable
purposes.74
Finally, Parton argued that wealthy financiers
established charitable institutions only to morally legitimize
their "ill-gotten property."7 5 He condemned these institutions as
Committee (see infra Part IX(D)), 1960's Patman's Reports (see infra Part XI), 1965
Treasury Report (see infra Part XIII), Petersen Commission (see infra Part XIV), as well
as in the various legislative policy debates regarding either the charitable deduction and
its expansion or the regulation of private foundations.
72.
See Diamond, supra note 25, at 19; Witte, supra note 26, at 382. The argument
that the concentration of wealth in exempt perpetual institutions damaged democracy
became the primary justification for the 1916 Walsh Commission's call that industrialists'
foundations be limited to a 25-year life span. See infra Part IX. This argument and
recommendation of limited life continued through the 1954 Reece Committee (see infra
Part IX(D)), Patman Reports (see infra Part XI), 1965 Treasury Report (see infra Part
XIII), eventually being codified in 1969, not as a limited life regulation, but rather as an
allowable maximum shareholding in any given business (see infra Part XV).
73.
Brody, supra note 56, at 600.
74.

See JAMES PARTON, TAXATION OF CHURCH PROPERTY, at 11 (1873).

75.
Id. at 12. Senator Peffer, Kansas, reiterated this view in the debate on the 1894
Tariff Act: "... no man ever earned a million dollars in a year .. Take the most
prosperous merchant in the country. .. He earns $10,000 every year. No, he does not; he
makes that much ... but he gains it off of the profits over and above those that were fair
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not established to undertake charitable purposes but rather to
conjure adulation and fill the void during the founders'
retirement. 76
Positing the liberal arguments against exemptions, Parton
combined the moral Jacksonian liberals with the economic
liberals.77
He submitted the Jacksonian belief that charity
stripped men of their spirit of self reliance, thus charity morally
degraded men.78 He forwarded the liberals' economic contractual
argument 79 for tax equity: "Whatever property the state protects
ought, I think, to contribute its proportion to the State's
support."8 These two liberal positions combined led him to the
conclusion that special exemptions stripped the favored
charitable class and its recipients of the morality of self-reliance,
while in the same breath creating the injustice of inequitable
burden against the non-favored class.8'
Fourth, positing another economic liberal criticism of
exemption, taxation facilitated the competitive process of the
elimination of inefficient use of property. 2 This liberal theory of
competition addressed the earlier economic justification that
charitably employed land should not be taxed due to the lack of
income to pay the tax. These Darwinian liberals argued that the
non-income producing property unable to meet the property tax
obligation should be confiscated and sold back into the system of
commerce, allowing efficient uses for it to be found.83 Parton
presented the example of a town with seventeen Protestant
churches, stating that half were superfluous, acting on a drain of
the available resources for all of them.84 The 1874 District of
and just between man and man .... Now I say that no man can honestly claim that
which he has not earned ..
" CONG. REC., 53rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6635 (1894) (statement of
Sen. Peffer). This view continued to be expressed by all the 1912 presidential candidates
and in the 1916 Commission on Industrial Relations. See infra Part IX.
76.
PARTON, supra note 74, at 12.
77.
Diamond, supra note 25, at 21.
78.
Id. at 22.
79.
Id. at 19.
80.
PARTON, supra note 74, at 3.
81.
See Diamond, supra note 25, at 22.
82.
See Diamond, supra note 25, at 19. According to Parton:
An institution exempt from taxation may be a very good fungus, but it
comes short from being a living branch.
Taxing ecclesiastical
property, so far from being an injury to the church, would be one of
those just, wise, and timely measures which benefit everybody and
hurt nobody ....
It would extinguish some feeble life; but it would
strengthen and vivify the fittest, which would survive.
PARTON, supra note 74, at 4:
83.
PARTON, supra note 74, at 4-5.
84.
Id. According to Parton:
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Columbia property tax led to Church seizures; however, the
resulting political backlash must have been the cause of the tax's
repeal five years later because Congress returned all monies
collected.85
C. Dr. Eliot's Defense
During 1875,
Massachusetts
considered eliminating
charitable exemptions.
Appearing before the Commission in
order to protect his institution's exemption, the President of
Harvard College, Dr. Charles Eliot, employed economic and
public policy justifications to counter the liberal and populist
critiques summarized by Parton.
He drew first from the
historical
economic policy justification that charitable
institutions provide beneficial public service, stating: "There is a
return, both from a church and a college, and from a sewer and a
highway, in the benefits secured to the community."8 8 He
differentiated the State's return from the public service provided
by churches, colleges and hospitals from that obtained from
railroads, factories and steamships based on the altruism of the
former versus the profit motive of the latter, concluding that
"Itlheself-interest of no man, and of no association
of men, would
89
lead to the establishment of a university."
Why, then, do they not unite? It is because none of them can quite
succeed in dying. While there is life there is hope. They hold on, and
will hold on, as long as it is possible for the annual expenses to be
met. The law of survival of the fittest hungers for the extinction of
half of them; but that beneficent law is balked and frustrated by the
exemption from taxation.
That blessed Bankruptcy, which Mr.
Carlyle so justly extols as nature's remedy for superfluous and
mismanaged activities, hangs over them threatening, but powerless,
because they do not have to bear their just share of the public
burdens.
Id. at 5. But see infra Part XI (noting that the 1965 Treasury Report eventually rejected
this argument in that it concluded that the many small foundations established by groups
enriched the pluralism of the U.S. social order).
85.
See Diamond, supra note 25, at 18.
86.
Id. Regarding charitable institutions, Massachusetts provided exemption from
tax for the personal property and real estate of literary, benevolent, charitable and
scientific institutions. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO
THE

EXPEDIENCY OF REVISING OF AMENDING THE

LAWS

RELATED TO TAXATION AND

EXEMPTION THEREFROM 152 (1875) [hereinafter 1874 MASS. REPORT].

87. See Diamond, supra note 25, at 22-23.
88. ELIOT, supra note 42, at 369.
89.
Id. at 374-75. Dr. Eliot's exemption justification based on profit without private
gain, derived from the earlier 1850 debates on church exemption, became the employed
argument to bring mutuals and fraternal associations under the exemption provision of
the 1894 Tariff Act. See remarks of Senator Hill infra Part VII. Further, Congress
adopted this justification in the 1909 Payne Aldrich Tariff Act's exempt provision,
specifying that the exempt association's net income may not be used for private gain. See
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He added a tax subsidy component to this justification,
arguing a government-benefit analysis: ".... the State believes,
or at least believed when the exemption statute was adopted,
that the indirect gain to its treasury which results from the
establishment of the exempted institutions is greater than the
loss which the exemption involves."0 He posited that "[s]uch is
the absolute necessity of the public work which the institutions of
religion, education and charity do, that if the work was not done
by these private societies, the State would be compelled to carry
it on through its own agents or through its own charge"9' and
that "The State believes that the new road will be such a
convenience to the community, that the indirect gain for making
it will be greater than the direct and indirect loss. "92 Expanding
on the tax subsidy justification, he furthered that all income
producing property of the charitable institution should be tax
exempt in that the income expands the institution's capacity to
undertake the public work, such as education for the poor, to the
relief of government.9 3
In support of the government benefit analysis argument, Dr.
Eliot proffered that if Harvard was made liable for the fifty to
sixty thousand dollars of tax that the city would impose in
absence of the exemption, it may eliminate twelve to fifteen
professor positions to produce the difference, and that as the land
value, thus taxes, increased, more positions could be eliminated. 4
The loss of these jobs would harm the institution's ability to
provide quality education while reducing the local community's
economic wage earners.9 5 Further, as the University library
added books for use by all, the library also would be required to
produce the annual income to pay the additional tax incurred
based upon the additional value of the books.96 The Observatory
would be closed because its total endowment income would be
used to pay the tax burden. Finally, as the surrounding city
increased in value, the tax burden would correspondingly

infra Part VII.
90.
ELIOT, supra note 42, at 370.
91.
Id. at 372 (discussing the tax subsidy argument).
92.
Id. at 370.
93.
Id. at 375. According to Eliot: "Institutions of high education have never been
self-supporting in any country; and there is no reason whatever to suppose that they can
be. If they were made self-supporting, they would be inaccessible to the poor, and be
maintained exclusively for the benefit of the rich." Id.
94.
Id. at 390. He further presented that the state would lose upwards of 25% of its
education services through a repeal of the tax exemption. Id. at 391.
95.
See id. at 391
96.
Id. at 390.
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increase upon the University. 9'
Critics retorted that the local citizens, while acknowledging
the accrued benefits of charitable institutions, inequitably bore
the tax 98exemption subsidy for the enjoyment of the entire
country:
Those who urge this objection admit that the
public receives great benefit from churches,
colleges and hospitals; but, as these institutions
necessarily have local habitations, and taxes under
our laws are locally levied, they allege that the
particular cities or towns in which the institutions
happen to be situated bear, in loss of taxable
property, the so-called burden of their exemption,
while the whole State, or perhaps the whole
country, shares the public benefits which accrue
from them. The public burdened, it is alleged, it
not the same public as the public benefited.99
First, Dr. Eliot posited that charitable institutions did not
produce significant benefit beyond locality.'
Next, Dr. Eliot
argued that regardless of benefit beyond the locality bearing the
burden, not granting a tax exemption did not necessarily lead to
taxable property filling the vacant space. 0 '
Following, he proffered that even if such revenue producing
property did fill the void, then that taxable property immigrated
12
from another locality, reducing the latter locality's tax base.
Finally, he countered that exempt property is not a zero sum
game locally between exemption and revenue but rather that the
charitable institutions actually increased tax revenues by raising
the value of the property in the community surrounding them,
drawing new residents and consumers to the locality."3
Critics presented a further revenue loss argument regarding
the migration of personal property, such as cash, through
97.
See id. at 391.
98.
In the 1894 Tariff Act debates, Senator Peffer posited this argument against
Senator Hill's proposal for exemption of mutual saving banks, stating that the
agricultural states would bear the burden of the Northern based association's exemption.
See infra Part VII.
99.
ELIOT, supra note 42, at 376.
100.
Id. at 381.
101.
Id. at 376.
102.
Id. at 376,378.
103.
See id. at 377, 379-80. Dr. Eliot gave examples of colleges and churches
increasing the land value of the community around them. Id. at 379-80.
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donations being sent from one locality to another. Dr. Eliot
countered that each locality with exempt institutions equally
obtained the possibility of receiving such gifted money from other
localities. °4 He also reasoned that without the potential for such
gifts to exempt institutions, the money would be consumed
rather than invested.'
Finally, he offered as a practical
economic justification that non-productive land did not produce
the income to pay any levied taxes, thus no revenue could be
exacted.106
In the vein of public policy argument, Dr. Eliot posited that
tax should only be levied upon commercial activities for private
gain, distinguishing these from commercial activities to support
public service. °7 First he argued that property contributed to
charity underwent a change in its nature: "the money which built
[the institutions] is no longer to be counted as property, in the
common sense. It can never again be productive, except for the
purposes of the trust for which it was set apart."'' 8
Second, he proposed that "churches, colleges, and hospitals
serve the highest public ends" shaping the public's character, as
opposed to the lower order public services of schools, roads,
prison and police." 9
He concluded that by consequence of
providing for the higher order ends, the charities should be
exempt from contributing to the lower order services."'
Third, he argued that the exemption contributed to the
American policy of freedom from government by "combining
liberty with stability in free institutions.""' He posited that
liberty required many municipal centers, allowing citizens to
expressly associate independent of government in order to oppose
the centralized power of the government. 2 In contrast to the
U.S. situation, he posed that the French government's
concentration of all power unto itself led to its people being
inexperienced in associated
action, and thus their lack of ability
3
to exercise liberty.1
104. Id. at 378.
105.
See id.
106.
See id. at 389 (presenting the example of a church whose land and building,
valued at $3,000, would require $4,500 to pay the tax beyond its normal operating
expenses).
107.
See Diamond, supra note 25, at 24.
108. ELIOT, supra note 42, at 369.
109.
Id. at 371, 374. This argument furthered the 1850s church argument that
churches promoted personal morality, public spiritedness, and democratic values. See
supra Part V.
110.
See ELIOT, supra note 42, at 371,374.
111.
Id. at 392-93.
112.
See id. at 392.
113.
See id.
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In presenting his tax policy justification for what types of
income should be taxed, Dr. Eliot sought to draw a distinction
between income earned in furtherance of, and ancillary to, a
charitable purpose, and other income earned for profit. First, he
distinguished unproductive land and gifts from commercial
activities. Unproductive land, he argued, is neither owned like
ordinary property nor remunerative, and thus should not justly
be taxed." 4 Second, charitable gifts, he argued, are an expression
of benevolence not driven by private gain, and benevolence
should be favored over self seeking."'
Dr. Eliot relinquished two situations in which an
institution's property should be taxed. First, he relinquished the
issue of tax for accumulated property beyond that required to
accomplish the charitable purpose: "No exempted institution can
hold real estate free of taxes except that which is fairly necessary
for the purposes of the religious, educational or charitable
trust.""' 6 However, as to the issue of limiting the property
exemption for such institutions:
If the legislature could tell with certainty just how
much property it was expedient for a church, or a
college, or a hospital to have, then a limit for
exempted property in each case would be natural
and right; but the legislature cannot have this
knowledge; and if they could acquire it for to-day,
it would be outgrown to-morrow. Moreover, the
circumstances and functions of the various
exempted institutions are so widely different and
so changeable, that each institution would
necessarily have its own limit prescribed by law,
and would be incessantly7 besieging the legislature
for a change in its limit.1
Furthering this argument, he proposed that a tax exempt
charity held its assets in a public trust for the public's benefit
and that the public would not want to limit its ability to benefit
from the trust's charitable acts."8
114.
Id. at 374.
115.
Id.
116.
See ELIOT, supra note 42, at 386.
117.
Id. at 387.
118.
See id. at 388; see also supra Part IV (noting that state charters to charitable
corporations frequently limited the amount of income or assets). The 1916 Walsh
Commission recommended limiting the amount of assets allowed for a foundation. See
infra Part VIII.
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Secondly, he relinquished tax exemption for that
institution's income earned with the view toward profit:

an

It would be dishonorable evasion of the real intent
of the statute to claim exemption on real estate
which was bought with the intention of selling it
again at a profit; and if any addition could be made
to the statute that would make such a practice
impossible, or would subject it to penalties any
institution which should be guilty of it, such and
addition would be an improvement ....
9
However, he separated for profit income from that earned to
support the charitable purpose or earned in conducting the
business of the charitable purpose, by example a church selling
land to support itself, the poor, or to change premises. 2 '
As to the argument that the wealthy abused their exempt
endowments, Dr. Eliot countered that the wealthy, but not the
poor, could live without them:
To prejudice the mass of people against
endowments is the part of a demagogue, for it is to
induce them to act ignorantly in direct opposition
to their own real interests; since endowments exist
for the benefit of the great mass of people, while
they are a matter of but slight concern to the rich.
The rich man does not care whether education be
dear or cheap; he does not want the scholarships of
college; he does not need to send his children to a
hospital; he could afford to keep a clergy man in
his own family if he cared to. It is the poor man
who needs the church which others have built; the
college which, because it has endowments, is able
to offer his ambitious son a liberal education; the
hospital which can give him, when disabled,
attendance as skillful and careful as the rich man
can buy. 2 '
119.
ELIOT, supra note 42, at 386. Not until 1939 did Congress enact the predecessor
to the unrelated business income regulations, placing this type of income outside the
charitable exemption, thus subjecting it to normal tax. See infra Part IX.
120.
See ELIOT, supra note 42, at 386.
121.
Id. at 385. The criticism of abuse by the wealthy most strongly played in
Congressman Patman's 1960 reports, in which he cited specific examples on a foundationby-foundation basis. See infra Part X. However, the Treasury in its 1965 report
concluded that it found very few cases of such abuse. See infra Part XI. Abuse of
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In order to protect against the abuse of an exemption, he
proposed judicial scrutiny of the sale of land that could lead to
personal inurement, the publication of annual returns, the loss of
exemption for institutions that later turn out not to have a public
character
and the reformation of institutions committing any
21 2
abuses.
In addressing a criticism that social expenditures decided
upon by exempt institutions violated the U.S. concept of
representative democracy, Dr. Eliot proposed that charities are
better suited for determining and providing public service
because they foster self reliance through avoiding the political
corruption and divisiveness of centralized government. 123 In
support that government grants lead to a powerful government,
he stated:
The exemption method is emphatically an
encouragement to public benefactions. On the
contrary, the grant method extinguishes public
spirit. No private person thinks of contributing to
the support of an institution which has once got
firmly saddled on the public treasury. The
exemption method fosters the public virtues of selfrespect and reliance; the grant method leads
straight to an abject dependence
upon that
24
superior power-Government.
As to the tax policy criticism that a taxpayer should not be

foundations by wealthy taxpayers formed the pretext justification of the 1943 reporting
requirements (infra Part IX(A)), 1950 regulations (infra Part IX(B), and 1969 extensive
regulations (infra Part VIII).
122.
See ELIOT, supra note 42, at 393-94. Three of Dr. Eliot's proposals found their
way into federal legislation. Prohibition against personal inurement, though missing in
the first federal charitable tax exemption of 1894, entered in the 1909 Payne-Aldrich
Tariff Act . See infra Part VII. Congress enacted an annual foundation reporting
requirement in 1943. See infra Part IX. The Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) has the
authority to strip a non-profit of its exemption for non-compliance with its charitable
purpose and the tax regulations. The I.R.S. does not have the authority to reform a nonprofit, which is a matter of the state law in which the non-profit in incorporated.
123.
ELIOT, supra note 42, at 383. Morris Hillquit, founding member of the
American Socialist Party, and Pastor John Haynes Holmes, provided testimony to the
1916 Walsh Commission, refuting this contention. See infra Part VIII. They testified
that all expenditure should be subject to government choice because: (1) government
contributed to the charitable institution through relinquished tax, and thus had an
indistinguishable interest in the endowment; and (2) the wealth that established the
foundation derived from the common man's labor. See infra Part VIII.
124.
ELIOT, supra note 42, at 383.
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made to support, through the burden of exemption, a charitable
institution either not of his choosing or from which he derives no
benefit, Dr. Eliot responded that the basis of taxation required
that taxpayers support a host of activities, such as public
education, though not beneficial to, or the choice of, each
taxpayer.121 In countering Parton's argument that exemption led
to the scattering of more endowments than could be maintained
by the community, Dr. Eliot agreed126that in such a situation the
endowments needed to consolidate.
In dealing with the argument against the dead hand
127
presented by James Madison, Dr. Eliot responded two fold.
First, he contended that the dead hand argument was primarily
antagonistic to the Catholic Church, thus a bigoted attempt to
discriminate against Catholics that obviated from the principle of
legislating toward a particular religion. 1 8
Second, though
theoretically possible, he saw few circumstances in which an
endowment would actually outlive its charitable purpose.129
However, he argued that such circumstances of mischievous or
outlived endowments could only be investigated when the state
granted exemption which in turn granted the state the right of
inspection into the endowment's affairs. 3 '
Thus, Dr. Eliot
postured that the government should require an annual public
reporting in exchange for exemption.' 3 '
D. The Massachusetts'Decision
In its decision, the majority of
Commission sided with Dr. Eliot stating:

the

Massachusetts

All gifts, whereby the individual shows any true

125.
See id. at 385.
126.
Id.
127.
The dead hand concept justified Henry VIIIs enactment of the Statute of Uses'
rule against perpetuities, as well as the various enactments of statutes of mortmain . See
supra Part III. The dead hand criticism carried forward in every negative committee
report on foundations. By example, the 1916 Walsh Commission proffered the dead hand
criticism against industrialists establishing perpetual philanthropic foundations that
would inevitably manipulate the U.S. educational system to encourage industrialist policy
over labor rights policy . See infra Part VIII. Approximately 40 years later in 1954, the
Reece Committee proffered that the industrialists' perpetual foundations manipulated the
U.S. educational system in favor of socialism. See infra Part IX(D). Each negative report
recommended limiting a foundation's life span from a range of 10 years to 40 years.
128.
See ELIOT, supra note 42, at 383-84.
129.
Id. at 384.
130.
Id.
131.
See id. As discussed below, Congress enacted an annual foundation-reporting
requirement in 1943. See infra Part IX.
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self-forgetfulness for the public good, will not only
be welcomed, but the disposition to make them will
be encouraged and fostered by every wise state. As
a general rule, all such gifts are in the exact line of
what the state seeks to secure by its taxation, and
there is really just as great an absurdity in taxing
them as there
would be in retaxing the taxes
32
themselves. 1
The Commissioners favored the social policy tack, nearly
ignoring Dr. Eliot's tax subsidy justifications.'
The
Commissioners stated that the goal of social progress, and thus
government's role to support, was the relinquishment of selfinterest and private gain in favor of altruism and benevolence
toward others.'
Charitable gifts and institutions best achieved
this goal of relinquishment of self-interest and private gain.
Second, in alignment with Dr. Eliot's public policy reasoning, the
Commission stated:
Property, which passes out of private hands a freewill offering for public uses, and which loses
thereby its entire power of reproducing itself for
private gain or emolument, deserves very different
treatment, for it must ever stand in a very
different relation to the state from that which
private parties can still control for private ends. '
In turning to the state property tax exemption for mutual
insurance companies, the Commission recommended that, absent
the historical exemption, equity required eliminating their
exemption because as business operations, they were similarly
situated to manufacturing and commerce.'36
Finally, in
concluding its report on tax exemption, the Commission called for
annual reporting on exempt property. 137
132.
1874 MASS. REPORT, supra note 86, at 154.
133.
See supra Part IV (noting that the Massachusetts constitution directed the
legislature and courts to promote in the public the principles of general benevolence,
social affections, and generous sentiments).
134.
See Diamond, supra note 25, at 27. Dr. Eliot wrote that "[t]o develop noble
human character is the end for which States themselves exist .... ELIOT, supra note 42,
at 371; see also infra Part VIII (in which Samuel Untermyer, a socialist labor attorney
and organizer, testifying to the 1916 Walsh Commission, supported this finding as the
ultimate justification for maintaining the charitable exemption).
135.
1874 MASS. REPORT, supra note 86, at 154.
136.
See id. at 173.
137.
Id. at 178. The reporting would allow the state to continually assess the impact
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E. The Massachusetts'Minority Report
The Commission's minority report started with the
proposition that exemption, which correspondingly required an
increase of all other's tax rates, should only be granted in two
situations: (1) to institutions, more efficient than the state, that
are agents or instrumentalities of the state and (2) to institutions
whose activities are not within the scope of the state but in its
best interests to maintain regardless of the costs.'38 In support of
the more efficient instrumentality position, the minority argued
against exemption but for those institutions "doing the work
which but for them the Commonwealth herself must do, and
doing it as well and at as little cost as the officers or agents of the
government would do it."'39 The minority posited that the state
alone, not charities and individuals, owns the right to provide
education, hospice, and for the poor. 40 Consequently, the state
has a right, based on its assessment of the efficiency of the
provision of services by an organization, to establish and revoke a
state grant of agency and exemption. 4 '
Further, the minority stressed that the scope of the
exemption must be limited to the resources directly necessary for
accomplishing the services, thus allowing tax assessment upon
an organization's additional resources such as land. 142 In this
context, an exemption grant should be limited to the value of the
property required to be employed, that value taking into
consideration the income produced from the exempt property.
The state should periodically review the exempt institutions to
determine the sufficiency of the property employed, adjusting the
value of property exempted pursuant to the need for performing
the services.'43 Answering the argument that constricting the
exemption will in turn constrict the institution's resources to
carry out its charitable activities, the dissent countered that the
increase in taxes upon all other taxpayers thus constricted their
ability to pursue their own activities, a countervailing
detriment. "' The minority concluded that exempt institutions, as
organs of the state, report annual returns to the respective state
agency responsible for the area of service, such as the board of

of exemption. See id. at 174.
138. See id. at 182.
139. Id.
140.
1874 MASS. REPORT, supra note 86, at 181-83.
141.
See id. at 183.
142.
See id.
143.
See id. at 184-85.
144.
See id. at 185-86.
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education and board of state charities, so that the agency could
assess the provision of services and assess tax upon surplus
property. 145
Regarding religious exemption, the minority observed that,
after disestablishment, the church could not be an organ of the
state, and thus could not be exempt pursuant to the
instrumentality position. 146 Pursuant to the church's activities
filling societal needs beyond the scope of state action, the
minority observed that the increasing value of the church
property rendered the increasing value of the tax abatement
uneconomical in comparison to the benefit of the church to the
community. 7 The minority agreed with Presidents Madison and
Grant that, pursuant to contractual equity, the church should
contribute for its enjoyment of state services and that pursuant
to social-economic equity, an exemption would lead to harmful
undue accumulation.'4 8 As to the benefits of the church to the
state and society, the minority argued that every citizen also
serves the state and society, for which the state does not owe
compensation. "49
The minority
noted that churches
uneconomically employed exempt funds for building expensive
temples for festivities, and that the same denomination
uneconomically located many churches close together. 150 While
acknowledging that the buildings of the church represented fine
art, the minority contended that the beauty of its buildings did
not constitute a justification for exemption along the same lines
as the teaching of social morality.' 5 '
Regarding Dr. Eliot's
argument that the churches' grand edifices created land value
and economy around them, the minority responded that all
business' grand buildings attracted the same, but without
the
152
corresponding involuntary assessment upon the taxpayers.
145.

See id. at 188-89.

146.

See 1874 MASS. REPORT, supra note 86, at 190.

147.
See id. at 191-93. The Commission noted that in the U.S. between 1850 and
1870, churches had grown from 38,061 to 63,082, with an increase in property value from
$87 million to $354 million. Id. at 192. In Massachusetts, the number of churches grew
from 1,475 to 1,764 during this period, and their property value increased from $10
million to $24 million. Id. Between 1870 and 1874, the property value further increased
to $30 million. Id. at 192-92
148.

See id. at 191-92.

149.
See id. at 192. This position is similar to that posited by the Senate Finance
Committee in the 1864 Congressional debate, that all activities of goodwill support good
government, benefiting each person personally. See supra Part VI.
150.
See 1874 MASS. REPORT, supra note 86, at 194.
151.
See id. (according to the minority, "[t]he church was exempted from taxation
because of its moral affect upon the community, not that it might become a teacher of the
fine arts .... [e]xemption may be justified by the former of these considerations, not that
latter").
152.
See id. at 194-95.
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As to arguments based in a historical exemption, the
minority replied that the state does not contract with its citizens
regarding baseless immunity from taxes but rather provides
exemption in exchange for services, and that exemption may be
withdrawn at any time.'
The minority contended that the
church, having enjoyed exemption, had grown strong enough to
stand on its own.'54 However, conceding the societal value of
religious institutions in the area of morality and peace, the
minority recommended a ceiling threshold for all churches, so
that small congregations would not dissolve because of the tax
liability."'
VII. 1890-1900: THE 1864 CONGRESS' FEAR PLAYS OUT ON THE
1894S CONGRESS EXPANDING EXEMPTIONS AND THE SCOPE
OF EXEMPTION

By the 1890s, more institutions received state tax
exemptions and for a wider scope of their income generating
activities, such as endowments. 5 6 The exemptions flourished
based on the economic policy justification of the trade off of public
service for tax subsidy."7 In 1892, the Supreme Court clearly
scoped this government-benefit policy in line with that
enunciated by Dr. Eliot in 1875."8 According to the Court:
A grant of exemption is never to be considered as a
mere gratuity - a simple gift from the legislature.
No such intent to throw away the revenues of the
State, or to create arbitrary discriminations
between the holders of property, can be imputed. A
consideration is presumed to exist. The recipient of
the exemption may be supposed to be doing part of
the work which the State would otherwise be
under obligations to do. A college, or an academy,
furnishes education to the young, which it is a part
of the State's duty to furnish. 5 '
As to the tax subsidy element of this policy, it stated:

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See id. at 196.
See id. at 197.
See id. at 197-99.
See Diamond, supra note 25, at 32.
See id. at 32-34.
See supra part VI(C) (discussing Dr. Eliot's government-benefit analysis).
Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Decatur, 147 U.S. 190, 201 (1893).
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In a general way it may be said that the probable
amount of future taxes can be estimated. While of
course no mathematical certainty exists, yet there
is a reasonable uniformity in the expenses of the
government, so that there can be in advance an
approximation of what is given when an exemption
from taxation is granted ....
Further, the Court maintained the public policy rationale
that charitable institutions produced a public good, perhaps not
quantifiable, in line with Dr. Eliot's proposed justification that
exempt organizations served the highest public ends, 6' stating:
"Or the recipient may be doing a work which adds to the material
prosperity or elevates the moral character of the people; [such
as] ...churches and charitable institutions,
162 because they tend to
a better order of society. (emphasis added)"'
In 1894, at the instigation of Congressman Woodrow Wilson,
Congress enacted the income tax, imposing a two percent tax on
"net profits or income above actual operating and business
expenses ... of all ...corporations, companies, or associations
doing business for profit.' ' 163 Though having categorically rejected
the proposition thirty years earlier, Congress included the first
federal tax statute exempting charitable associations from
taxation: "Nothing herein contained shall apply..,
to
corporations, companies, or associations organized and conducted
solely for charitable, religious, or educational purposes ....,,164
In exempting charitable associations from the application of
the Act, the provision also exempted their endowment income.
Congress rationalized that charitable institutions provided
desirable public purposes, thus justifying the exemption. 65
The general topic of exemptions from income tax was fiercely
debated in the Senate. However, the debate focused on who was
to receive exemption, not on whether any exemptions should be
160.
Id. at 202.
161.
See supra part VI(C).
162.
Illinois Cent. R.R.. Co., 147 U.S. at 201.
163.
Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit
Organizationsfrom Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 302 (1976).
164.
See Mark Rambler, Note, Best Supporting Actor: Refining The 509(A)(3) Type 3
CharitableOrganization,51 DUKE L.J. 1367, 1370 n.16 (2002) (noting that the income tax
sections of the Tariff Act were later found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895)).
165.
See Charles 0. Galvin & Neal Devins, A Tax Policy Analysis of Bob Jones Univ.
v. United States, 36 VAND. L. REV 1353, 1365 (1983) (stating that Congress clearly
justified the Tariff Act's tax exemption for charitable, religious, or educational
organizations on the basis that such organizations served a desirable public purpose).
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included.'6 6 By example, the bill included a personal exemption
from tax for the first four thousand dollars of income. 67 In
response to this exemption, Senator Hill, New York, stated:
If there must be an income tax, it should be
substantially uniform and consistent, and should
tax all incomes or none at all .... There should be
no favoritism, no discriminations, no privileged
classes.
If a tax upon industry, thrift, and
earnings is defensible at all, then all exemptions
are matters of governmental charity and must
necessarily be very limited and reasonable.'68
As forecast by the 1864 congressional reason for denying
exemption that "every effort would be made to bring cases within
the principle," a number of other non-charitable but nonprofit
mutual organizations, including fraternal beneficiary societies
operating upon the lodge system that provided life, sick, accident,
and other insurance, and building and loan associations, received
tax exemption.6 9 Lobbying played the key role in the extension
of these exemptions.' 7
In an about turn from his opening statement on the inequity
of exemptions, Senator Hill shortly thereafter lobbied for
exemptions for mutual saving banks and mutual life insurance
companies.'
In arguing for a privileged exemption for mutual
saving banks, he stated: "Argument ought not be necessary to
sustain the proposition that mutual savings banks should be
absolutely exempt from any income taxation. They represent the
savings of the poor; they are not established for ordinary
business purposes ..... ,172 He ended his argument in favor of
exempting mutual savings banks with: "This Government can
not afford to permit the
savings of the poor to be taxed through a
173
Federal income tax."

166.
By example, potential exemptions included an exemption from tax for the
income of government employees and for homesteads. See 26 CONG. REc 6629 (1894)
(statement of Sen. Hoar).
167.
26 CONG. REC. 6620.
168.
Id. (statement of Sen. Hill). The Massachusetts Minority Report stated nearly
this reasoning. See supra part VI(E). As examined below, Senator Hill then proceeded to
lobby for exemptions that would benefit the businesses in his state, New York.
169.
Diamond, supra note 25, at 36.
170.
See id. at 36 n.85.
171.
See 26 CONG. REC. 6622-23 (1894) (statement of Sen. Hill).
172.
Id.
173.
Id.
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Senator Peffer, Kansas, retorted to Senator Hill that it was
inequitable that his constituency, the agricultural states, should
bear a burden of tax different than the North:
The point to be made is that because wealth is
accumulated in New York, and not because those men are
more industrious than we are ... but because they
trade... buy and sell.., deal in usury, because they reap
in what they never earn ... take in and live off what
other men earn, they shall be exempt from taxation, and
that we who are hewing wood and carrying water
shall
71 4
continue to bear the burdens of the Government.
Senator Higgins argued that exemptions "would be the
disposition on the part of one section of the country to impose the
burden of taxation upon the other, that they might thereby
escape themselves."'75
Lobbying for the exemption of mutual life insurance
companies, Senator Hill proposed:
The same excellent reasons why mutual savings
banks should be exempted from this tax apply with
full force to mutual life insurance companies....
Life insurance, when conducted as a business for
gain, has no more claim than any other business to
exemption from taxation. . . . But life insurance
by the head of a family for the protection of his
family ought not be taxed. This is a fundamental
principle of public economy and public policy which
has not been directly questioned by any high
authority. 176
Senator Hill offered two tax policy justifications and a
political one for the exemption, thus encouragement, of mutual
insurance. As with mutual savings banks, he argued that that
the income tax applied to profits, whereas the mutual did not
operate for profit. 7 7 Second, he pointed out that the growth of
the insurance fund required the premiums to be invested in the
stocks of companies that were themselves subject to the income

174.
175.
176.
177.

26 CONG. REC. 6634 (statement of Sen. Peffer).
26 CONG. REC. 6627 (statement of Sen. Higgins).
26 CONG. REC. 6623 (statement of Sen. Hill).
See 26 CONG. REC. 6623 (statement of Sen. Hill); Diamond, supra note 25, at 37.
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tax.178
Consequentially, he argued, the mutual insurance
company's investment income had already been taxed, and
without exemption the same income would be taxed again.
Worse yet, he pointed out that the present language of the bill
could be interpreted to tax the death benefits, thus three levels of
taxation on the income. Politically, he argued that the mutual
operated in the interest of the public by protecting the surviving
family from pauperism.179
In support of the exemption for fraternal organizations,
mutual insurance companies and mutual savings banks, Senator
Patton argued that any tax burden would only be passed onto the
consumer in rising insurance costs, reduced earnings from the
savings accounts, and finally, reduced insurance death benefit to
the surviving family. 80
Senator Platt, Connecticut, carried the above arguments for
exemption to the extreme. He analogized that if the above
exemptions were granted based on the justification of assisting
the common man, that then joint stock companies should also be
exempt from tax.' 8 ' He compared joint stock companies to mutual
companies, both operating as partnerships rather than
businesses, with small capitalization and with their members
consisting of the common employees. 8 2 He argued that the
contemplated four thousand dollar personal tax exemption
discriminated in favor of proprietorships over joint stock
companies to the detriment of the employees. 183 He reasoned that
only joint stock companies allow employees to retire because only
the joint stock allowed the retiring employee to extract capital by
selling to the other employees or a new member.'84
The Congress enacted the exemptions for fraternal societies
providing members insurance, building and loan associations,
and mutual savings banks. 85 Congress did not directly address
the subject of the charitable deduction. Senator Platt addressed
the concept of charitable deduction in passing, noting that "[the
Act] makes a man pay a tax not only on the premiums which he
pays to keep up his life insurance for the benefit of his family,
but upon all that he gives to charitable objects."'86 Further,
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

See 26 CONG. REC. 6623 (1894) (statement of Sen. Hill).
See id. (statement of Sen. Hill).
See 26 CONG. REC. 6697 (statement of Sen. Patton).
See 26 CONG. REC. 6704 (statement of Sen. Platt).
See 26 CONG. REC. 6704-05 (statement of Sen. Platt).
See 26 CONG. REC. 6705 (statement of Sen. Platt).
See 26 CONG. REC. 6705 (statement of Sen. Platt).
Diamond, supra note 25, at 36.
26 CONG. REC. 6706 (1894) (statement of Sen. Platt).
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Senator Hoar, in addressing the issue of whether citizens should
be taxed though residing abroad, expressed a trade-off between
charitable contribution and taxation:
So, if an American citizen went abroad and carried
the protection of his country, of his citizenship
with him, he did not escape its burdens. There are
a great many people ... who go abroad for that
very purpose .... they had none of the voluntary
obligations which rest upon citizens, of charity, or
contributions, or supporting churches, or anything
of that sort, and they escaped taxation.'87
The 1909 Payne Aldrich Tariff Act continued the exemption,
legislating the charitable exception from application of the
corporate excise tax. Notably, Congress added the restriction
against private inurement: "any corporation or association
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes, no part of the net income of which inures to
the benefit of any private stockholder or individual."(emphasis
added).'8 8 Congress did not interpret nonprofit as either nonbusiness or non-surplus generating. 8 ' On the contrary, Congress
and the Supreme Court adopted Dr. Eliot's argument that tax
should only be levied upon commercial activities for private gain
versus those for public service. The 1924 Supreme Court held:
Two matters apparent on the face of the
[excepting] clause go far towards settling its
meaning. First, it recognizes that a corporation
may be organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific or educational
purposes, and yet have a net income. Next, it says
nothing about the source of the income, but makes
the destination the ultimate test of exemption.
Evidently the exemption is made in recognition of
the benefit which the public derives from corporate
activities of the class named, and is intended to aid
them when not conducted for private gain. Such
activities cannot be carried on without money; and

187.
188.
189.

26 CONG. REC. 6632-33 (statement of Sen. Hoar).
TariffAct of 1909, ch. 6, 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112-13 (1909).
See Brody, supra note 56, at 605-06.
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it is common knowledge that they are largely
carried on with income received from properties
dedicated to their pursuit. This is particularly true
of many charitable, scientific and educational
corporations and is measurably true of some
religious corporations. Making such properties
productive to the end that the income may be thus
used does not alter or enlarge the purposes for
which the corporation is created and conducted. 90
The federal policy that destination of income trumped source
of income expanded the historical scope of exemption derived
from the states' policies that merely granted limited, albeit
expanding, tax exemption to churches and educational
institutions.'
Dr. Eliot stated that exemption policy was not
intended to cover activities established to generate profit,
distinguishing them from those conducted in the business of the
charitable purpose.'9 2 This federal divergence from historical
state policy continued until the enactment of the tax on
unrelated business income.

VIII.

1900-1940: THE RISE OF THE INDUSTRIALIST PRIVATE
FOUNDATION, THE (IGNORED) POPULIST RESPONSE OF THE
WALSH COMMITTEE

The accumulated industrialist wealth of the late nineteenth
century U.S. industrial revolution ushered in the next phase of
the charitable institution, the private foundation. 3 Before the
190.
Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores de la Provincia del Santisimo
Roasrio de Filipinas, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924). The Court upheld this interpretation until
the enactment of the tax on unrelated business income. See C.F. Mueller Co. v. Comm'r,
190 F.2d 120, 121-22 (3d Cir. 1951). In C.F. Mueller Co., the court stated:
[T]he statute lends itself to the result so far achieved ... since it
plainly contemplates that there may exist income otherwise taxable
and does not proscribe any particular source of income ....
The
policy ... is that the benefit from revenue is outweighed by the benefit
to the general public welfare gained through the encouragement of
charity.... This point of view has predominated through the more
than thirty years....

190 F.2d at 121-22.
191.
See supra Part V.
192.
See supra Part VI(C).
193.
See Marsh, supra note 10, at 142-43. The various commissions, congressional
committees, and government reports from 1916 thereon, discussed herein, focus on the
philanthropic, private foundation. Congress did not codify a formal "private" foundation
definition until 1969, but beginning in 1943 enacted legislation treating the
philanthropists' class of foundations differently from traditionally publicly supported
institutions. This evolution of different treatment is thoroughly explored infra.
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194
twentieth century, only five foundations had been established,
whereas over sixty foundations were recorded by 1910. 9 By
1913, three industrialists, Russell Sage, 96 Andrew Carnegie,'97
and John D. Rockefeller, 9 8 from their personal wealth established
foundations whose purpose was to promote their particular
philanthropic vision for society.'99 Carnegie and Rockefeller's

194.
Marsh, supra note 10, at 143.
195.
Crimm, supra note 3, at 780. However, as Professor Crimm notes, there is some
disagreement over the number of foundations established before 1910. See id. at 780
n.157.
196.
See Crimm, supra note 32, at 1103 (noting that Mrs. Sage is credited with
establishing the first modern foundation, in the name of her husband, being an "openended endowment devoted to self-defined goals of reforming the public's social, economic,
and political existence; vesting broad discretion in trustees; and relying on a professional
staff to identify private institutions deserving of grant funds."). The Russell Sage
Foundation's 1907 Letter of Gift from Margaret Olivia Sage states:
I have transferred to Russell Sage Foundation... a fund, the
principal of which ... shall be held, and the income thereof applied to
the improvement of social and living conditions in the United States of
America ....
The scope of the Foundation is not only national but is broad. It
should, however, preferably not undertake to do that which is now
being done or is likely to be effectively done by other individuals or by
other agencies. It should be its aim to take up the larger and more
difficult problems, and to take them up so far as possible in such a
manner as to secure co-operation and aid in their solution ....
Letter of Gift, at http://www.russellsage.org/about/letter-of gift.shtml (last visited July 1,
2003).
197.
Andrew Carnegie donated $350,000,000 to a variety of personal foundations and
charity, including the Carnegie Institute of Pittsburgh, founded in 1896, the Carnegie
Institution of Washington, founded in 1902, the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, founded in 1910, and the Carnegie Corporation of New York, founded in 1911,
amongst several others. Andrew Carnegie, at http://econl6l.berkeley.edu/TCEH/
andrewcarnegie.html (last visited July 1, 2003). While Carnegie established many
foundations, it has been argued that he was not the first to do so. See Crimm, supra note
32, at 1102-04 (stating that although Andrew Carnegie's essay the Gospel of Wealth
established the intellectual vision for the industrialist's philanthropy, he cannot be
credited with establishing the first philanthropic personal foundation). However, as
Professor Crimm notes, it was Carnegie's founding of the open ended Carnegie
Corporation of New York, four years after Mrs. Sage's gift to the Russell Sage Foundation,
that marks his establishment of an industrialist foundation. See id. at 1103-04.
198.
John D. Rockefeller began making philanthropic donations in 1889, beginning
with gifts to found the University of Chicago, and later went on to establish the
Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, founded 1901, and the Rockefeller Sanitary
Commission, founded 1909. A History: Introduction, at http://www.rockfound.org/
Documents/180/intro.html (last visited July 1, 2003). Also in 1909, he established the
trust for the Rockefeller Foundation, but was denied a federal charter. Id. Finally, in
1913 the State Legislature of New York chartered the foundation. Id. In 1913 and 1914,
he donated one hundred million to his foundation. A History: Timeline, at http://
www.rockfound.org/Documents/180/1913.html (last visited July 1, 2003).
199.
See Marsh, supra note 10, at 142-43; Crimm, supra note 3, at 780 (discussing
the establishment of the Carnegie Institute of Pittsburgh, the Carnegie Institute for
Technology, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the Russell Sage
Foundation).
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philanthropic vision held that social ills could be relieved through
funding business-like institutions that employed skilled
professional staff and undertook scientific research to produce
tangible results.2 0
This foundational model created the
philanthropic policy of the many foundations to follow in the
early twentieth century, such as Kellogg and Lilly.20 '
This new type of philanthropic foundation attracted critics in
the vein of James Parton, but with the Church focus replaced
with an industrialist focus. 2 2 Both 1912 Republican platform
presidential candidates, William Taft and Theodore Roosevelt
(Progressive Republicans), opposed the establishment of such
industrialist foundations on the premise that their charitable
nature should not be used to justify the nature of the production
of the income, the industrialists' greed. 2 3 The populist opinion
against the industrial class' method of income accumulation had
been expressed by Parton in 1873 and again during the debates
upon the 1894 Tariff Act. Senator Peffer summed up the populist
sentiment:
Mr. President, I have said several times in this
presence that no man ever earned a million dollars
a year, and I will say that no man ever earned a
million dollars in a lifetime. Whenever men begin
to grow rich rapidly they are doing it because they

200.
See Marsh, supra note 10, at 143.
201.
See id. Other well-known Foundations establish around this time period
included Julius Rosenwald Fund (1917), Commonwealth Fund (1918), Twentieth Century
Fund (1919), Guggenheim Foundation (1929), and W.K. Kellogg Foundation (1930).
202.
See Crimm, supra note 32, at 1104. Dr. Charles Eliot served on the board of the
Rockefeller Foundation.
Margaret Miller, A GUIDE TO SELECTED FILES OF THE
PROFESSIONAL PAPERS OF SIMON FLEXNER AT THE AMERICAL PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY, at
http://www.amphilsoc.org/library/guides/flexner/flextext.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2004).
203.
See Brody, supra note 11, at 923; Crimm, supra note 32, at 1104 n.58. Quoting
from Tax-Exempt Foundations and Charitable Trusts: Their Impact on Our Economy,
Chairman's Report, House Select Committee on Small Business, Committee Prints, Cong.
Sess.: 87-2, Dec. 31, 1962 at Letter of Transmittal p. (v), President Theodore Roosevelt
wrote in 1908 that "The only way to counteract the movement in which these men have
been engaged is to make clear to the public what they have done in the past and just what
they are seeking to accomplish in the future." Ironically, though Theodore Roosevelt
openly attacked the industrial trusts in the early twentieth century, he sat as a trustee
for the Peabody Education Fund, established in 1867 by the financier George Peabody
with a contribution of two million dollars. See James Allen Smith, Private Foundations
and Policy Making, paper presentation, A Forum on Philanthropy, Public Policy and The
Economy,
May
13-14,
2002,
University
of
Southern
California,
at
http://www.usc.edu/schools/sppd/philanthropy/forum2002/papers/smith-paper.pdf
(last
visited July 5, 2003). The fund's purpose was to assist in reconciliation between the
Northern and Southern states after the War and supported public education in the South.
See id. The fund's grants were specifically directed at influencing policy decisions. See id.
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are using the wealth other men create.0 4
The election's winner, William Howard Taft, a social
progressive Republican, requested Congress to form a
Commission on Industrial Relations to investigate the
accumulation of the industrialists' wealth, including their
establishment and use of philanthropic foundations. 2 0 President
Wilson appointed Frank Walsh, the pro-organized labor, Kansas
City newspaper editor and attorney as the chairman of the
Commission
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
the "Walsh
Commission") 0
While the Commission's investigation is credited with
providing the backbone of the many negative Congressional and
Treasury Reports in the coming decades, the foundations'
defenders' testimony also provided the policy reasons for their
continuance and the backbone of the positive findings of the
future Treasury Reports.
Primary arguments both for and
against the foundations are exemplified in the following
testimony.
Samuel Untermyer, a socialist attorney representing
organized labor, in support of the federalization of foundations'
charters to contain severe restrictions eventually recommended
by the Commission, stated that "the organization of the
Rockefeller, Carnegie, Sage, and other similar foundations is a
fair illustration of the vice of the system." 20 7 However, he
continued that he did not share the fear and distrust of the
Commission toward foundations.
Surprisingly, he felt the
establishment of the foundations exemplified the "unselfish
public spirit," the ultimate justification in maintaining charitable
tax exemptions employed by the Massachusetts Commission.208
He further found that the foundation's managers represented a
204.
26 CONG. REC. 6635 (1894) (statement of Sen. Peffer).
205.
See Crimm, supra note 32, at 1104. The Commission on Industrial Relations
was created by an Act of August 23, 1912. Over three years the populist commission held
hearings on a wide number of subjects, primarily focusing upon the mistreatment of labor
caused by the industrialists' economic feudalism. The final report consisted of eleven
volumes of over eleven thousand pages of which the hearings on the subject of foundations
required over one thousand pages. See generally STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON INDUS.
RELATIONS, 64TH CONG., INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: FINAL REPORT AND TESTIMONY
SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS 81-86, 220-21, 7427-8013, 8015-8480 (Comm. Print 1916)

[hereinafter WALSH COMM.].
206.
Frank Walsh became the General Counsel to the Iron Workers Union, serving
from 1918 until his death in 1939. A History of the Iron Workers Union: The Depression
and a New Deal for Labor 1930-1940, at http://geocities.com/ironworkers373/
iwhistory6d.html.
207.

WALSH COMM., supra note 205, at 7430-31.

208.

Id.
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higher intellect than possible from government, and that their
public works outweighed the founders' "devious" methods of
wealth accumulation."' Finally, he suggested that the founders'
influence would die off with the founder.
Furthering Untermyer's finding concerning the intellect of
foundations' managers, George Perkins, a director of U.S. Steel
and International Harvester, stated that the foundations
provided efficient management of their resources whereas the
government acted oppositely.210 He posited that "[tlhe function of
Government should not be to manage, but to regulate and control
management."2"1' Finally, he proposed that public reporting of the
foundations' activities in the minutest detail would address the
Commission's concerns (this position being reiterated by several
of the foundations' supporters).2 12
Dr. Eliot, in defense of
interlocking foundation board, stated that such cross board
membership created efficiency for the foundations' operations."3
Also, he found that the most efficient board members were those
with the widest experience who should continue to be employed
in constant service to the community.1 4
To Chairman Walsh's question "Why should not foundations
be taxed?" John D. Rockefeller Jr. responded that the funds
should be left as large as possible to continue to make the
substantial contributions to the wealth of the community in
which they operated. 215
Further on this issue, A. Barton
Hepburn, Chairman of Chase National bank, stated "The theory
upon which all property of that character is exempt from taxation
is that it is doing a public service, and the public good it might do
would be impaired to the extent of the taxation."1
Morris Hillquit, a labor attorney and one of the three
founders of the American Socialist Party, put forward two
significant arguments against foundations.
First, the

209.
This position contrasted the position of Samuel Gompers, President of the
American Federation of Labor, who said that "I do not think that the Government of our
country or that the people of our country are ready to surrender the function of teaching
to a private institution such as the Rockefeller Foundation, with the history behind that
foundation - the means by which their moneys were first made and later accumulated."
Id. at 7647.
210.
Id. at 7599.
211.
Id.
212.
Id. at 7599; see also id. at 7857, 59-60 (John D. Rockefeller Jr.'s testimony); see
also id. at 8296 (Andrew Carnegie's testimony).
213.
Id. at 7965.
214.
Id.
215.
Id. at 7858; see supra Part VI(C) for Dr. Eliot's identical argument.
216.
WALSH COMM., supra note 205, at 8257; see supra Part VI(C) for Dr. Eliot's
identical argument.
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foundations were not organized for charitable purposes but
rather as instruments of the industrialists to improve the
economic efficiency of the workers. 217 He concluded, from his
examination of the testimony of John Rockefeller Jr., and of the
expenditure of foundational resources for social studies and the
global eradication of disease, that
...we have reached this stage that the welfare of
the American worker is no more as important to
the American capitalist as is the well-being and
economic efficiency of the worker or of the
population in foreign undeveloped countries, for we
can not sell more commodities to our own
population, which is deprived of the means to
purchase, so we must undertake to sell them or
exchange
them
for other commodities in the
forein
J •211
foreign countries.

Regarding foundations support of higher education: ...
the
actual object of this educational work ...is not to in any way
elevate the general intellectual condition of the people ...; but it
is to train a sufficient and efficient corps of workers, of helpers, of
assistants, in the great industrial establishments., 21" Finally, in
objecting to tax exemption, he argued that the government has
an interest in the Rockefeller Foundation because the
government's contribution represents two million dollars a year
in relinquished taxes, for which the public must make up the
difference. 22' Also arguing against tax exemption, Pastor John
Haynes Holmes, evolving Senator Peffer's 1894 populist
argument, testified that the foundations were established from
wealth earned from the common man's labor, and thus
government should democratically decide where the foundation's
resources should be spent. 221
Henry Ford testified that he was opposed to charity and
philanthropy, employing the Jacksonian liberal position
enunciated by Parton, because it weakened the self-reliant spirit
of men.222
His publicly stated beliefs against charity and

217.
Parton's
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

WALSH COMM., supra note 205, at 8265-66; see supra Part VI(B) for James
critique that the philanthropists lacked the charitable motive of altruism.
WALSH COMM., supra note 205, at 8265-67.
Id. at 8268.
Id. at 8274-75.
Id. at 7916-17.
Id. at 7630.
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philanthropy haunted his heirs in that his 1947 establishment of
the Ford Foundation led to the charge by Treasury Secretary
John Snyder that the "abuse of tax exemption involves the
establishment of so-called charitable foundations or trusts which
serve as a cloak for controlling businesses. 22 3
In 1916, the Walsh Commission's congressional final report
section on foundations first noted that the Rockefeller and
Carnegie Foundations' assets of over two hundred fifty million
dollars earned annually more than thirteen million five hundred
thousand dollars, being more than twice the federal
appropriations for education and social services.224 Second, the
Commission found that the foundations were manipulating
educational and thus social policy. 2 25 Presented in support of this
finding, some universities had severed their religious affiliation
in order to receive grants from Carnegie's foundations.
Also,
the Commission received testimony from two professors that,
because of their support of the labor movement, their institutions
fired them.227
The Commission's conclusions were:
12. The domination of men in whose hands the
final control for a large part of American industry
rests is not limited to their employees, but is being
rapidly extended to control the education and
"social services" of the Nation.
13. This control is being extended largely through
the creation of enormous privately managed funds
for indefinite purposes hereinafter designated
"foundations" by the endowment of colleges and
universities, by the creation of funds for the
pensioning of teachers, by contributions to private
charities, as well as through controlling or
influencing the public press ....
15. The funds of these foundations are exempt
223.
Revenue Revisions of 1950: Hearings on H.R. 8920 Before the House Committee
on Ways and Means, February 3, 1950, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1950) (Statement by Hon.
John W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury); see infra Part X(A).
224.
WALSH COMM., supra note 205, at 81.
225.
See id. at 84. James Madison, Ulysses Grant, and James Parton foreshadowed
this finding that the accumulation of exempt institutions' assets would provide such
capital as to influence, if not threaten, democratic institutions. See supra Part VI(B).
226.
See Walsh Comm., supra note 205, at 84.
227.
See id.
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from taxation, yet during the lives of the founders
are subject to their dictation for any purpose other
than commercial profit ....
18. The funds of the foundations represent largely
the results either of the exploitation of American
workers through the payment of low wages or of
the exploitation of the American public through
the exaction of high prices. The funds, therefore,
228
by every right belong to the American people.

As regards the "foundations" created for unlimited
general purposes and endowed with enormous
resources, their ultimate possibilities are so grave
a menace, not only as regards their own activities
and influence but also the benumbing effect which
they have on private citizens and public bodies,
that if they could be clearly differentiated from
other forms of voluntary altruistic effort it would
be desirable to recommend their abolition.2 29
The Commission determined that the industrialists'
foundations could not be workably differentiated from general
public charities.
Thus, the Commission recommended,
pursuant to those suggested by Untermyer, a federal charter for
all foundations with assets over one million dollars and more
than one function.23 ' Further, the charter's constitution should
define the allowable acts, limit the assets and the accumulation
of unexpended income, as well as provide for strict government
scrutiny over the investments while requiring published
reports. 212 In seeking to perhaps perpetuate its existence, the
Commission suggested a continuing investigation of all "endowed
institutions" exceeding a moderate amount of either assets or
income, including religious ones.233 Finally, the Commission
stated that the federal government should balance the power of
foundations by appropriating for education and social services. 214
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
for these
233.
234.

Id. at 81-82.
Id. at 85.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 85. The Minority Report to the Massachusetts Tax Commission called
same restrictions and regulations. See supra Part VI(E).
See Walsh Comm., supra note 205, at 85.
Id. at 86.
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IX. 1913-1940: THE EXPANSION OF EXEMPTIONS, CONTRACTION
OF EXEMPTION'S SCOPE, AND THE INITIATION OF THE
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION

During the investigation by the Walsh Commission,
Congress enacted the income tax in 1913 in which it maintained
the charitable associations' exemption from tax.2 35 As in 1894,
the exemption's scope was expanded, this time to cover scientific
and benevolent organizations.23 6 Congress again debated the
inclusion of mutual companies, using similar arguments as
1894.237 However, the Act's author, Representative Cordell Hull,
argued that explicitly expanding the exemption coverage was
superfluous in that the exemption was already understood to
apply to all non-profit making organizations: ".

.

. any kind of

society or corporation that is not doing business for profit and not
acquiring profit would not come within the meaning of the taxing
clause ....,,211
Treasury, perhaps because Congress did explicitly include
additional types of exempt organizations, treated the list as
exclusive. 9
Consequently, in 1916 at Treasury's request,
Congress expanded the scope of the exempt clause, in order to
prevent economic waste by the Treasury.240 In 1918 and 1921,
Congress further expanded the scope to include societies for the
prevention of cruelty to animals or children and for literary
241
purposes.
In the 1913 Act, Congress rejected, without debate, inclusion
of a deduction for charitable contribution.242 Congressman Rogers
presented the amendment, arguing that lack of the charitable
deduction penalized the benevolent community, thus curtailing
its contributions.2 43 However, just four years later, even after the
Commission on Industrial Relations' final report and
235.
Crimm, supra note 27, at n.4 at 4422 n.4 (noting that Congress expanded the
exemption to include "any corporation or association organized and operated exclusively
for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes.").
236.
See H.R. REP. No. 64-92, 64' Cong., 1" Sess. 4 (1916); see also Bittker &
Rahdert, supra note 163, at 303.
237.
26 CONG.REC. 1260 (1894) (statement of Rep. Goulden).
238.
See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 163, at 303 n.l (noting that Congressman
Hull's argument had strength in that the 1909 Act implicitly exempted building and loan
associations and fraternal societies if operated not-for-profit).
239.
See id. at 303.
240.
See id.
241.
Laurens Williams & Donald V. Moorehead, An Analysis of the Federal Tax
Distinction, in 4 Research Papers Sponsored by the Commission on Private Philanthropy
and Public Needs 2099, 2100 (1977) (summarizing the Revenue Act of 1950).
242.
See 50 CONG. REC. 1259 (1913); Rambler, supra note 164, at 1370.
243.
62 CONG.REC. 1259 (May 6, 1913) (statement of Rep. Rogers).
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recommendations, in the War Income Tax Revenue Act of 1917
Congress enacted the charitable deduction, as follows:
Contributions or gifts actually made within the
year to corporations or associations organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, or educational purposes, or to societies
for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals,
no part of the net income of which inures to the
benefit of any private stockholder or individual, to
an amount not in excess of fifteen per centum of
the taxpayer's taxable net income as computed
without the benefit of this paragraph. Such
contributions or gifts shall be allowable as
deductions only if verified under rules and
regulations prescribed by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, with 244the approval of the
Secretary of the Treasury.
The 1917 Congressional Record reflects that the allowance of
the charitable deduction up to fifteen percent of the taxable net
income was supported for three different policy reasons.245 First,
Congress wanted to mitigate the effects of the new high income
tax rate on charitable giving. 246 Senator Hollis, the amendment's
author, cited the fact that educational institutions would require
significant contributions to survive the war period because the
draft reduced the student population.
He stated that the
charitable deduction was required to support educational
institutions because: "Now, when war comes and we impose these
very heavy taxes on incomes, that will be the first place where
the wealthy men will be tempted to economize, namely, in

244.
The War Income Tax Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, 1201(2); see Rambler, supra
note 164, at 1370.
245.
Senator Hollis introduced the amendment with a twenty percent potential
deduction. See 65 CONG. REC. 6728 (1917).
246.
Richard P. Davies, Flat Tax Without Bumpy Philanthropy: Decreasing the
Impact of a "Low, Single Rate" on Individual CharitableContributions,70 S. CAL. L. REV.
1749, 1762 (1997) (citing Senate Comm. on the Budget, Tax Expenditures: Compendium
of Background Material on Individual Provisions (1994), reprinted in 11 EXEMPT ORG.
TAX REV. 527, 536 (1995). The maximum tax rate was 15%. Ellen P. Aprill, Churches,
Politics, and the Charitable Contribution Deduction, 42 B.C. L. REV. 843, 849 (20002001); see Note, The Charitable Corporation, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1168 n.1 (1951) (stating
that the growth of contributions to charities from 1929's $1,206 billion to 1949's $4,032
billion may be attributable to the charitable deduction and a backlash against
government's expanding welfare role).
247.
See 65 CONG. REC. 6728.
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248

donations to charity."
Using the government benefit policy argument, he further
argued that encouraging charitable contributions allowed a lower
tax rate. If charitable giving decreased, thus expenditure on
charitable programs, then Congress would have to replace the
charitable expenditure with government expenditure which
would in turn require higher tax rates .24 Also, he argued that
charitable giving produced greater economic and welfare benefit
to society than taxation:
For every dollars a man contributes for these
public
charities,
educational
scientific,
or
otherwise, the public gets 100 per cent; it is all
devoted to that purpose. If it were undertaken to
support these institutions through the Federal
Government or local governments and the taxes
were imposed for the amount, they would only get
the percentage, 5 per cent, 10 per cent, 20 per cent,
or 40 per cent, as the case may be. Instead of the
full amount,
they would get a third or a quarter or
250
fifth.,
a
Senator Hollis presented published editorials, in support of
his amendment, which presented further arguments. First,
Congress should not tax that charitable part of income given
"voluntarily to the public good. 25' Secondly, charitable gifts
should not be treated less than business losses for which
deduction was allowed.
Thirdly, without the deduction, the
taxpayer passed the tax liability, by withholding the tax payment
from the charitable donation, onto the charity.2' Thus, the lack
of deduction undermined the policy of tax exempt status.

248.
See 65 CONG. REC. 6728 (statement of Sen. Hollis).
249.
John A Wallace & Robert W. Fischer, The CharitableDeduction Under Section
170 of the Internal Revenue Code, in 4 Research Papers Sponsored by the Commission on
Private Philanthropy and Public Needs 2131; see supra Part VI(C) (discussing same
justification as enunciated by Dr. Eliot).
250.
65 CONG. REC. 6728 (statement of Sen. Hollis).
251.
"From the Washington Post August 25, 1917", Senate, 65 CONG. REC., at 6728;
Wallace & Fischer, supra note 249, at 2131-32. This policy justification reflected the
decision of the Massachusetts Tax Commission. See supra Part VI(D).
252.
"From Social forces in war time," Senate, 65 CONG. REC., at 6729.
253.
Id.; see Wallace & Fischer, supra note 249, at 2131-32. The example given is
that if taxpayer was going to donate X to charity, then the taxpayer, in order to pay the
tax on X, donates X minus the anticipated tax due on X. Consequently, the lack of
deduction creates a withholding tax for tax exempt institutions.
254.
"From Social forces in war time," Senate, 65 6729; see Wallace & Fischer, supra
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In 1918, Congress enacted an estate tax charitable
deduction, and in 1924, the gift tax charitable deduction.
However, in 1924, the Senate Finance Committee discussed, but
rejected, removing the fifteen percent ceiling for taxpayers that
in a ten-year period gave more than ninety percent of their
income to charity.
In 1936, Congress enacted the corporate charitable
deduction, establishing the maximum deduction of five percent of
corporate net income.2 57 The 1938 Ways and Means Committee
Report, explaining the justification for the corporate deduction,
employed the government benefit justification, stating:
The exemption from taxation of money or property
devoted to charitable and other purposes is based
upon the theory that the Government is
compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief
from financial burden which would otherwise have
to be met by appropriations from public funds, and
by the benefits resulting from the promotion of the
general welfare.
The populist criticisms expressed in the 1916 Walsh
Committee Report neither produced the suggested restrictive
regulation nor reduced the growth of private foundations.
Against the backdrop of the Great Depression, private
foundations still doubled in the thirties. 9 Of the two significant
foundation regulations legislated in the thirties, one resulted
from a moralist attack and one from an attack led by tax paying
business. In 1934, Congress enacted an anti-lobbying restriction
on tax-exempt charities in response to the lobbying activities of
Planned Parenthood's predecessor the American Birth Control
note 249, at 2131-32.
255.
Williams & Moorehead, supra note 249, at 2100.
256.
Vada Waters Lindsey, The Charitable Contribution Deduction: A Historical
Review and a Look to the Future, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1056, 1061 (2003).
257.
Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, Gifts, Gafts, And Gefts"- The Income Tax
Definition and Treatment of Private and Charitable "Gifts" and a Principled Policy
Justification for the Exclusion of Gifts From Income, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 441, 446
(2003); Crimm, supra note 32, at 1107.
258.
H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., at 19 (1938). The section quoted
specifically dealt with the reason why charitable deductions were limited to contributions
to domestic non-profits rather than including foreign ones.
By 1938, Dr. Eliot's
government benefit justification overtook his public policy, promoting selfless behavior,
justification as the stated reason for the charitable deduction.
259.
See Crimm, supra note 32, at 1107 (explaining that the number of foundations
more than doubled during the 1930s and suggesting that the introduction of the corporate
charitable exemption was a cause of the growth).
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League.26 °
In 1939, in response to complaints of unfair
competition by tax paying businesses, Congress enacted the
predecessor to the unrelated business income tax, the
Supplement U net income tax, to be imposed on a charitable
organization's unrelated business net income.26 '
A. 1940-1950: Congress Considers Eliminating the
CharitableExemption, Distinguishesthe Private
Foundation,Increases Yet Eliminates the Charitable
Deduction
Since 1935, Congress steadily increased the public's tax
burden through steeply progressive tax rates.262 The combination
of the progressive nature of the personal, corporate and estate
tax regimes pushed the upper income strata to use foundations.262
Meanwhile, the increasing tax burden with its corresponding
withholding collection at source created general public sensitivity
to taxation as most Americans became first-time taxpayers.6 4
This tax sensitivity naturally led to public interest in the
distribution of the tax burden. The foundation's exempt status
resulted in the contention of inequitable privilege.26 5
Because of the public perception of a congressionally
mandated privilege for the wealthy, in 1943 Congress considered
eliminating the foundation's tax exemption, but instead opted for

260.
Id. at 1106 (noting that Congress imposed the restriction to thwart the holding
in favor of the American Birth Control League in Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 184 (2d
Cir. 1930)). Twenty years later, Senator Lyndon Johnson strengthened the anti-lobbying
restrictions because a foundation had supported his opponent in his Senatorial election.
See id. at 1112-13. Johnson's amendment attached to the 1954 30% charitable deduction
increase authorized treasury to remove tax exempt status from a foundation that either
sought to influence legislation or to support a political candidate. See 100 CONG. REC.
9604 (1954)
261.
Crimm, supra note 32, at 1107 n.77; see also supra Part VIII (noting that this
provision merely returned to the historical status quo of the pre-1894 Act in that
originally, many states only granted limited tax exemption that did not encompass
activities outside those directly related to the charitable purpose).
262.
See Peter Dobkin Hall, Philanthropy, the Welfare State, and the
Transformation of American Public and Private Institutions, 1945-2000 at 12 (The
Hauser Ctr. for Nonprofit Org., Harv. Univ.., Working Paper No. 5, 2000), available at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hauser/active-backup/PDFXLS/workingpaper_5.pdf.
263.
See id. at 12-13.
264.
See Aprill, supra note 246, at 850 (stating that between 1939 and 1945,
taxpayers expanded from approximately 5% of the population to 74%).
265.
See Hall, supra note 262, at 12-13; see also supra parts V, VII(B) and (C), and
VIII (noting that the argument of inequitable burden merely continued from its mid-1800
origin). In that mid-century, the states' adoption of universal property taxes keenly
focused taxpayers' interest on exempt institutions, and the scope of income exempted.
The universal income tax produced the same result in the mid-1900s.
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gathering information to investigate the issue. 266 According to
the wording of the Ways and Means Committee report, the
Committee contemplated proposing the tax exemption's removal
yet: "... [in the absence of such information it was felt best to
continue the present tax exemption, ... " (emphasis added).2 7
The Committee stated that the disclosed information would be
used for the study of foundation's potential tax avoidance
behavior:
... [m]any of these exempt corporations and
organizations
are
directly competing with
companies required to pay income taxes, and that
this practice is becoming more wide spread and
affording a loophole for tax evasion and avoidance.
These organizations were originally given this tax
exemption on the theory that they were operated
not for profit, and that none of the proceeds inured
to the benefit of shareholders. However, many of
these organizations are now engaged in operation
of apartment houses, office buildings, and other
businesses which directly compete with individuals
and corporations required to pay taxes on income
derived from like operations. 2 8
Thus, beginning with the Revenue Act of 1943, Congress
required certain non-publicly supported foundations to file
annual returns disclosing gross income, receipts, and
disbursements.
In establishing this reporting requirement,
Congress discriminatorily distinguished between traditionally
exempt institutions, publicly supported foundations and all other
foundations. The legislation's new reporting requirements did
not apply to religious organizations, schools, certain fraternal
groups, publicly supported charitable organizations, and certain
government corporations.2 " This policy of applying greater
regulation to untraditional and non-publicly supported
foundations, i.e., private foundations became the cornerstone of
266.
H.R. REP. No. 78-871, at 25 (1943).
267.
H.R. REP. NO. 78-871, at 25 (1943).
268.
H.R. REP. NO. 78-871, at 25 (1943).
269.
See Crimm, supra note 32, at 1109 n.93 (citing H.R. REP. No. 78-871, at 24-25
(1943)); see also Williams & Moorehead, supra note 241, at 2101.
270.
See Crimm, supra note 32, at 1105 n.65; see infra part XV. In 1969, Congress
codified the definition of private foundations to be all foundations other than a more
expanded list than the 1943 legislation.
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private foundation legislation and the backdrop of the further
investigations leading thereto.
Congress, having just contemplated
removing the
exemption, a year later in the 1944 Individual Income Tax Act
raised the fifteen percent deduction ceiling by expanding the base
upon which it was applied, from taxable net income to adjusted
gross income, as it remains applied today."'
However, in
simplifying the computation of income tax for a majority of
taxpayers through the standard deduction, the 1944 Individual
Income Tax Act limited the charitable deduction to only
taxpayers that itemized."'
Representative Carl Curtis, a
proponent to save the charitable deduction for non-itemizers,
argued:
It has been the basic policy in America that our tax
program is one that considers a gift to the U.S.O.,
the Red Cross, a children's home, a hospital, a
home for the aged, a college, a mission, a church,
or any other institution rendering service and
mercy, an expenditure for the public good, and,
therefore exempt from taxation. 2 7
He also noted that non-itemization created a disincentive to
giving by taxing contributions that would in affect "cripple all of
these worth-while [sic] institutions 274
so that they must come to the
Federal Government for a subsidy.,
In response to Congressman Curtis' allegation that the lack
of deduction for low income taxpayers created a disincentive for
charitable giving, Congressman Robert Doughton, Ways and
Means Committee Chair, retorted that taxpayers gave
contributions for the "worthy causes such contributions advance"
as opposed to reducing their taxes. 275 Senator Walter George,
Finance Committee Chair, argued:
The committee does not believe that it can be
proved that a tax incentive has been an important

271.
See Lindsey, supra note 256, at 1062.
272.
Aprill, supra note 246, at 850.
273.
Id. at 851 (citing 90 CONG. REC. 3972-73, 4029 (1944) (statement of Rep.
Curtis)).
274.
Id. at 850-51 (quoting 90 CONG. REC. 4029 (1944) (statement of Rep. Curtis));
see supra Part VII(C) wherein Dr. Eliot argued similarly.
275.
Id. at 851 (quoting Ways and Means Committee, 90 CONG. REC. 3975 (1944)
(statement of Chairman Doughton)).
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factor in the making of such gifts by individuals
having less than $5,000 of adjusted gross income,
and certainly the $500 standard deduction will not
remove the tax incentive for persons in the higher
brackets, upon whom the charities depend for
contributions in substantial amounts.2 76
Supporters of the simplification, which Congress enacted,
defended that the standard deduction took into account a modest
average charitable deduction of 2 %.277
In the much publicized Ford Foundation gift by Henry Ford
in 1947, the Ford family maintained the voting stock, and thus
control, of Ford Motor Company while bequeathing the
nonvoting, dividend bearing stock to the foundation. 278 As a
result of the publicity, in 1950 President Harry Truman
complained in his address to Congress that charitable trust funds
were but vehicles for the donors' speculative investments that
misused "funds intended for charitable purposes. 27 9
His
Treasury Secretary John Snyder presented the following
testimony to the Ways and Means Committee, explaining:
Another... abuse of tax exemption involves the
establishment of so-called charitable foundations
or trusts which serve as a cloak for controlling
businesses. The present law permits the transfer
of business investments to tax-exempt trusts and
foundations for these purposes without payment of
estate or gift taxes. The income subsequently
received from the business is exempt from income
tax.
The abuse to which this type of device lends itself
is the retention and reinvestment of a major share
of the
income in a manner which will benefit
the trust
J280
the grantor.
276.
Id. at 851-52 (quoting Finance Committee, 90 CONG. REC. 4704 (1944)
(statement of Chairman George)).
277.
Id. at 852 (citing 90 CONG. REC. 3973 (1944) (statement of Rep. Robertson)).
278.
See Brody, supra note 11, at 923-24; Crimm, supra note 32, at 1109 n.91 (noting
that while Henry Ford established the Ford Foundation in 1936, he had been an
outspoken critic against philanthropy, ignoring the foundation until his 1947 bequest); see
Henry Ford's testimony at the Walsh Commission Vol. VIII, pp 7630.
279.
Thomas A. Troyer, The 1969 PrivateFoundation Law: Historical Perspectiveon
its Origins and Underpinnings, 27 THE EXEMPT ORGANIZATION TAX REV. 52, 53 (2000);

Marsh, supra note 10, at 148.
280.
Troyer, supra note 279, at 53 (quoting from Revenue Revisions of 1950:
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President Truman also raised the issue of business
acquisitions by tax-exempt organizations, most famously New
York University's acquisition of the Mueller Macaroni Co, which
removed these acquired businesses from the corporate tax base.
281 He stated that tax-exempt organizations were "misused in
a
few instances to gain competitive advantage over private
enterprise through the conduct of business and industrial
operations entirely unrelated to educational activities."282
Treasury Secretary Snyder presented several examples of noncharitable related businesses acquired by tax exempts, including
the production of automobile parts, china-ware, food products
and the operation of theaters, oil wells and cotton gins. 283 The
President, Congress, and public, from the data gleamed from the
several years of annual information returns and the subsequent
press reports, felt confirmed in their suspicion that the
industrialist class and their families rampantly abused
foundations to maintain control of family businesses while
avoiding taxation.
B. The Tempered 1950 Act Curbs Abuse
In order to curb the perceived abuse, in 1950 the House
passed a stringent bill that (1) denied the charitable deduction
for a family's contribution of its controlled business to its
foundation; (2) levied tax upon undistributed investment income;
(3) forbid contributors, officers, directors, trustees, and certain
related parties from engaging in financial transactions with their
foundation; and (4) levied tax on "income derived from a trade or
business 'regularly carried on' by a tax-exempt organization if the
business is not 'substantially related' to the performance of the
functions upon which the organization's exemption is based. 2 85
The Senate outright rejected the House's proposed denial of
deduction for contributed but controlled family businesses 286 The
Hearings on H.R. 8920 Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, February 3,
1950, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1950) (Statement by Hon. John W. Snyder, Secretary of the
Treasury)).
281.
See Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizingthe Charity Tax
Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L 585, 608 (1998).
282. Mass. Med. Soc'y v. United States, 514 F.2d 153, 154 (1st Cir. 1975) (citing
Hearings on Revenue Revision Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 4, 5 (1950)).
283. Id.
284. See Crimm, supra note 32, at 1109; Marsh, supra note 10, at 148.
285. Troyer, supra note 279, at 53; Williams & Moorehead, supra note 241, at 2101
(quoting from S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. 3081 (1950)).
286. S.REP. No. 2375, at 3092 (1950).
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Senate justified the situation of continued control with two
propositions.
First, the Senate reasoned that income of
contributed business interests must be used for charitable
purposes. 217
Second, the Senate weighed that the loss of
contributed funds to private charity would be greater than the
House proposal's increase in tax revenue.288
Regarding a foundation's accumulated income, the Senate
rejected the House's proposed levying of tax as too inflexible and
likely to damage worthwhile charities. 2
The Finance Committee
replied:
Your committee does not question the contention
that some organizations are abusing their taxexempt privilege by undesirable accumulations of
income.
However,
witnesses
before,
and
statements presented to, your committee brought
out quite clearly that the measure passed by the
House was too inflexible and as a result would
seriously injure many worth-while educational and
charitable projects. To mention some problems
under the House provision:
(1) A foundation could not use any of its income to
endow another organization unless the latter
was of a type not subject to the accumulations
tax.
(2) A foundation could not set aside funds which, if
subsequently matched by another organization, would
be spent for some specific purpose.

(3) Foundations may find that as the result of a crisis,
such as a war, they are unable to spend their funds for
a period of time for the purposes for which they were
organized.
(4) Funds irrevocably set aside in a 5-year trust fund as
provided by the House bill may not be needed at the
end of the 5-year period for the specific project for
which they were set aside, and
287.
288.
289.

Id. at 3092.
Id.
Id. at 3087.
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(5) One year's earnings, the accumulations permitted by
the House bill, may not be sufficient to even out
variations in the earnings or needs for funds of a
foundation.
The Senate instead voted in favor of expanding the
information disclosure beyond the requirements of the 1943
Act. 9
The Senate projected that the requirement to publish
information about the accumulations would encourage
distributions while revealing the extent of the accumulations.'2 9
The expanded information return included: (1) its gross income
for the year; (2) its expenses attributable to such income; (3) its
disbursements out of current income for its educational,
charitable, etc., purpose; (4) its accumulation of income within
the year; (5) its prior accumulations of income; (6) its
disbursements out of principal; and (7) a balance sheet.2 2
As to the House's call for the elimination of all financial
transactions between a foundation and the donors and related
parties, the Senate stated that such transactions should be
allowed but limited in extent to an arm's length standard. 29 3' The
House reported that donors "either have derived, or at least have
had the opportunity to derive, substantial benefits from their
dealings with the trusts or foundations." 9 4 According to the
House, the benefits:

290.
Troyer, supra note 279, at 53-54 (referring to Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No.
81-814, S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. 1950).
291.
S. REP. No. 2375, at 3087 (1950).
292.
Id. at 3088.
293.
Troyer, supra note 279, at 53-54; see S. REP. No. 2375, at 3090 (1950):
It is important to note in the above listing of prohibited transactions that under your
committee's bill the prohibited transactions are restricted to transactions in which a
donor (including a testator) or a member of his family is likely to gain some special benefit
from the transaction.
Moreover, these prohibited transactions do not apply to
transactions between the exempt organization and its trustees, directors or officers.
294.
S. REP. NO. 2375, at 3089 (1950)S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess.
3089(1950). The House's tack of prohibiting such transactions aligned with Dr. Eliot's
and the Massachusetts Tax Commission's two contentions for exemption: (1) that the
exempt property neither be owned like ordinary property nor be remunerative, and (2)
that charitable gifts be an expression of benevolence not driven by private gain. Further,
the Massachusetts Tax Commission's concluded that exempt property should not be
controlled by private parties for private ends. See supra Parts VII(C) & (D). The 1909
Tariff Act's personal inurement clause codified these contentions. The Senate's solution
abrogated these contentions in that it allowed the donor to obtain an arm's length
remuneration or gain in dealing with the foundation's assets. The Senate's allowance of
an arm's length gain expanded the historically intended scope for a donor's interaction
with charitable gifts.
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take the form of selling securities to, or purchasing
securities from, the trust or foundation under
conditions which benefit the donor ... from the
borrowing of funds from the exempt organizations
with the payment of abnormally low interest rates
by the donor or the assumption of abnormal risk by
the exempt organizations
...
payment of
excessive salaries to the donor or a member of his
family as an official of the trust or foundation, or of
rendering services on a preferential basis to the
donor or a firm with which he is associated.9
In its analysis, the Finance Committee replied:
Your committee is in sympathy with the goals
sought by the above provisions of the House bill
but believes they would be unduly harsh in their
application. No objection is seen to engaging in
transactions with donors if these transactions are
carried out at arm's length. Moreover, many
foundations and trusts would find it either
impossible or very difficult to stipulate in their
instruments that they will not engage in the
specified transactions even though they never have
done so and never expect to do so. Nevertheless,
donors to such organizations could not deduct their
contributions under the income, estate, or gift
taxes. Also an organization might unintentionally
violate one of the requirements, such as paying
what might be held to be an unreasonable salary,
and then, when its return was examined several
years later, find that it would lose its exemption
for the past several years.
As a result your committee has recast the House
provisions to remove their harshness. Prohibited
transactions have been redefined as including only
transactions in which an organization(1) lends any part of its income or corpus without
adequate security or at an unreasonable rate of
interest to donors, members of their families, or a
corporation which they control,
295.

S. REP. No. 2375, at 3089.
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(2) pays any compensation to such persons other
than a reasonable allowance for personal services
actually rendered,
(3) makes any part of its services available to such
persons on preferential basis,
(4) makes any substantial purchase of securities or
other property from such persons without
adequate consideration,
(5) sells any substantial part of its securities or
other property to such persons without adequate
consideration, or
(6) engages in any other transaction which results
in a substantial diversion of its income or corpus to
such persons. 29 6
Regarding the application of the expanded reporting
requirements
and the "arm's length" rule, Congress
distinguished "public" type foundations from the general class of
foundations, continuing the distinction inaugurated in the 1943
Revenue Act's reporting requirements. 2" These new regulations
did not apply to "religious organizations, schools, publiclysupported
organizations,
governmentally
supported
organizations, and medical organizations, including hospitals."298
The Senate Finance Committee explained that because these
organizations are "public," they "are not believed likely to become
involved in any of the prohibited transactions. , 9 9 Thus, the 1950
Revenue Act reiterated the distinction, based on the criterion of
either public nature or public support, between public and all
other (private) foundations that continues to set the tone of
private foundation regulation."'
Regarding the House's proposal in response to President
296.
S. REP. No. 2375, at 3080.
297.
Crimm, supra note 32, at 1109 n.96; Williams & Moorehead, supra note 241, at
2102 n.22 (The organizations required to file this information, which is to be made
available to the public, include all organizations exempt under § 101(6) now required to
file informational returns (Form 990) under § 54(f)).
298.
Crimm, supra note 32, at 1109 n.96. S. REP. NO. 2375, at 3091; Marsh, supra
note 10, at 149.
299.
Crimm, supra note 32, at 1109 n.96; see S. REP. NO. 2375, at 3091.
300.
See Marsh, supra note 10, at 149; Troyer, supra note 279, at 54.
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Truman's address for the taxation of business income of charities
not related to the charitable mission, the Finance Committee
concurred that unfair competition with tax paying business
justified the levying of tax to create a level playing field.30 '
Commenting on President Truman's publicized example of NYU's
acquisition of C.F. Mueller, a macaroni production company,
Congressman Dingle argued that "[e]ventually all the noodles
produced in this country will be produced by corporations held or
created by universities ... and there will be no revenue to the
Federal Treasury from this industry. 3 2 The Finance Committee
concluded:
The problem at which the tax on unrelated
business income is directed is primarily that of
unfair competition. The tax-free status of section
101 organizations enables them to use their profits
tax-free to expand operations, while their
competitors can expand only with the profits
remaining after taxes ....
In neither the House bill nor your committee's bill
does this provision deny the exemption where the
organizations are carrying on unrelated active
business enterprises, nor require that they dispose
of such businesses. Both provisions merely impose
the same tax on income derived from an unrelated
trade or business as is borne by their competitors.
In fact it is not intended that the tax imposed on
unrelated business income will have any effect on
the tax-exempt status of any organization.303
301.
S. REP. No. 2375, at 3081; H. REP. NO. 2319, 81" Cong., 2d Sess. 36-7 (1950);
Williams & Moorehead, supra note 241, at 2101.
302.
Brody, supra note 281, at 608 (citing Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 580 (1950) (remarks of Rep. Dingell)). The
Commissioner challenged New York University's (N.Y.U.) contention, based upon its own
tax exemption, of exemption for the macaroni production company. C.F. Mueller Co. v.
Comm'r, 190 F.2d 120, 121 (3d Cir. 1951). The macaroni company's profits exclusively
benefited the law school. Id. The Court found for N.Y.U. based on the historical
interpretation of the exemption. Id. at 123. According to the court:
We agree that the statute lends itself to the result so far achieved...
since it plainly contemplates that there may exist income otherwise

taxable and does not proscribe any particular source of income....
The policy ... is that the benefit from revenue is outweighed by the
benefit to the general public welfare gained through the
encouragement of charity .... This point of view has predominated
through the more than thirty years....
Id. at 121-22.
303.
S. REP. No. 2375, at 3081.
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The Senate bill listed several examples of what constituted
substantially related business income as well as exceptions to the
new rule's application."4 By example, universities' substantially
related income included athletic programs and university
presses.
The Senate provided exception for the sale of gift
merchandise, such as old clothes, which were donated
to be sold
••
306
with the proceeds going to the exempt organization.
The Conference Committee's compromise primarily favored
the Senate's less restrictive policy for private foundations, and
was legislated into the Revenue Act of 1950.307 Thus, the
Revenue Act of 1950's new regulations included: (1) the
requirement of arm's length dealing for private foundations when
engaging in "prohibited transactions" with, or for the benefit of,
donors and related parties (known as "self-dealing"), the
corresponding sanction for engaging in a non-arm's length
"prohibited transactions" of self-dealing was to be stripped of
section 501(c)(3) tax exempt status;30 8 (2) levying tax upon a
foundation's unreasonable accumulation of income; 3 9 (3) levying
tax on a foundation's unrelated business income (known as
"UBI");310 and finally (4) expanding disclosure requirements."'
C. The 1952 Cox Committee
The 1950 Revenue Act reforms did not satisfy Congress'
anti-industrialist wing but rather strengthened the fervor of
attacks on the foundation sector. 2 Interestingly, the thrust of
the attacks changed from accusing the foundations of
304.
See id. at 3082.
305.
See id.
306.
See id.
307.
See PUB. L. No. 81-814, 64 Stat. 947 (1950) (enacting I.R.C. §§ 502, 503, 504,
and 511-4, reenacted as part of the I.R.C. of 1954); Troyer, supra note 279, at 54.
308.
See Marsh, supra note 10, at 148-49.
309.
See Troyer, supra note 279, at 53-54 (noting that the loss of exemption for
accumulated income applied when it was "(1) unreasonable in amount or duration, (2)
used to a substantial degree for other than exempt purposes, or (3) invested in such a
manner as to jeopardize the carrying out of exempt functions."). Considering the focus on
the issue of charitable institutions accumulations from James Madison to the 1916 Walsh
Commission, this regulation was a long time coming. Dr. Eliot relinquished the point
that exempt institutions property in excess of the requirements to accomplish its
charitable purpose should be taxed. However, the I.R.S. did not actively pursue
enforcement of this regulation because of the severity of the penalty. In the 1965
Treasury Report (see infra Part XIII), Treasury noted that its study found that a very
small percentage of private foundations unreasonably accumulated income.
310.
See Revenue Act of 1950.
311.
Id.
312.
See Crimm, supra note 3, at 788.
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manipulating social and public policy in favor of industrialism to
accusing them of promoting leftwing causes.3 13
In typical
McCarthy-esque rhetoric, Congressman Edward Cox charged
foundations with funding "outright communists, fellow travelers,
socialists, do-gooders, one-worlders, wild-eyed Utopians and wellmeaning dupes."314 Yet these attacks fell on deaf ears because
Congress enacted two increases in the deduction ceiling,
resulting in a maximum thirty percent of adjusted gross
income.315
In 1952, Congress established the "Select Committee to
Investigate
and Study Educational
and
Philanthropic
Foundations and Comparable Organizations which are Exempt
from Federal Income Taxation" (known as the "Cox Committee")
"to determine which such foundations and organizations are
using their resources for un-American and subversive activities
or for purposes not in the interest or tradition of the United
'
States."316
Three distinct instigators directed the Commission's
3
mission. 17 First, the nationalists, known as the Brickerites,
alleged that the Foundation's support of international
organizations, such as the United Nations, threatened U.S.
sovereignty.'
Second, the progressives desired to use the
Committee to attack the potential presidential candidacy of
General Dwight Eisenhower, who was supported by some
directors of prominent foundations, against their candidate
Senator Robert Taft. 3 9 Third, the bi-partisan anti-communist
group viewed foundations with the same disdain as the previous
anti-industrialists .320
The Cox Committee sent questionnaires to over fifteen
hundred organizations, interviewed over two hundred persons,
heard the testimony of twenty individuals, received prepared
statements from an additional seventy, and communicated with a

313.
See FOUNDATIONS, PRIVATE GIVING, AND PUBLIC POLICY: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON FOUNDATIONS AND PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY
65 (1970) [hereinafter PETERSEN COMMISSION].

314.
PETERSEN COMMISSION, supra note 313, at 65 (quoting Congressman Cox of
Georgia in the American Legion Magazine article entitled "Let's Look at Our
Foundations").
315.
See Lindsey, supra note 256, at 1062-63.
316.
Brody, supra note 11, at 924 (citing PETER DOBKIN HALL, INVENTING THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR 182, at 67-68, 291 n.191 (1992) that quotes from H.R. Res. 561, in
Hearings Before the Select Comm. to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and
Comparable Organizations, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1952)).
317.
See PETERSEN COMMISSION, supra note 313, at 65-66.
318.
See id. at 65.
319.
See id.
320.
See id. at 65-66.

11/11/2004 1:21 PM
11/11/2004 1:21 PM

BYRNES-MACRO
BYRNES-MACRO

554 HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAXLAW JOURNAL [Vol. IV
further two hundred by telephone and post. 2 ' The Cox
Committee estimated the existence of approximately thirty
thousand tax exempt organizations of which only between sixty
and one hundred qualified as private foundations with assets of
ten million dollars.322 Also, the Cox Committee estimated that
private foundations constituted but three percent of charitable
spending.323
Contrary to the desire of the Cox Committee's instigators, its
1953 Final Report concluded that Congress should foster the taxexempt sector with expanded tax incentives, but require public
accounting.1 4 The Cox Committee proposed that foundations
justified the incentives because they provided the necessary
venture capital "expended in advancing the frontiers of
knowledge."32' 5
The Committee explained that the large
foundations played a more significant venture capital role than
government could play, stating:
With trained professional staffs drawing upon
knowledge gained through decades of experience,
with the ability to attract and hold men of great
competence both in their governing boards and
staffs, with large sums of money to back their
judgments and with complete freedom to spend the
money on calculated risks, they are able to do that
which neither government nor individuals, nor
even small
foundations, could or probably should
26
attempt.1
The Committee pointed out that foundations not only
significantly impacted the fields of health, medicine, natural
science, social science, public administration, international
relations, the arts, economics, amongst other areas, but were the
best suited vehicle for continued research in these areas.3 27 The
321.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FINAL REPORT

OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO

2514, 82nd CONG.,
2nd SESS., at 2 (1953) [hereinafter COX COMMITTEE].
322.
Cox COMMITTEE, supra note 321, at 2.
Private foundations, under the
Committee definition, excluded colleges, universities, and religious organizations. Id.
323.
Id. at 3.
324.
Id. at 13.
325.
Id. at 3; Williams & Moorehead, supra note 241, at 2104. Senator Cox died
before the issuance of the committee's final report.
326.
COX COMMITTEE, supra note 321, at 4. This point evolved from Dr. Eliot's
contention that charities presented a better fora for determining and providing public
service. See supra Part VII(C).
327.
See COX COMMITTEE, supra note 321, at 4.
INVESTIGATE FOUNDATIONS AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS, H. REP. No.
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Cox Committee concluded that, probably in reference to the 1916
Walsh Commission, "[t]he foundation, once considered a boon to
society, now seems to be a vital and essential factor in our
progress.328
The Cox Committee stated mild criticisms of foundations'
activities compared to the intent of the Committee's instigators.
First, the Cox Committee found few instances of employment of
relatives by the smaller foundations.329
Second, the Cox
Committee reviewed 35,731 grants, of which it found only 63 to
be questionable."' It found that the Soviet Union and its U.S.
Communist party ally had a specific program to infiltrate
foundations in order to manipulate their work, but that rare
circumstances of that infiltration occurred, with the notable case
being Alger Hiss.33' Third, the Cox Committee found that the
public mistrusted foundations because of the lack of geographical
representation amongst the directors who primarily all resided in
New York.33 2 The Report suggested that foundations, to deal with
these criticisms, provide significantly more information in the
annual information return, including: (1) total annual
contributions; (2) gross annual income; (3) expenses attributable
to such income; (4) breakdowns of administrative expenses,
including salaries above four thousand dollars; (5) the amount,
general purpose, and recipients of grants; (6) accumulation of
income during the year and aggregated throughout its life time;
(7) balance sheet; and (8) contributors over two hundred dollars
and amounts contributed.33
D. The 1954 Reece Committee - If at First You Don't
Succeed, Try, Try Again
Not receiving the conclusions that it sought, in 1954 the
populists initiated a new special committee (the "Reece
Committee") to re-investigate tax-exempt private foundations.334
Congressman B. Carroll Reece's (Tennessee) on the House floor
responded to the Cox Committee's report in favor of a reinvestigation:

328.

Id. at 5.

329.

See id. at 6.

330.

PETERSEN COMMISSION, supra note 313, at 66.

331.

See COX COMMITTEE, supra note 321, at 7-8.

332.

See id. at 11.

333.

Id. at 15.

334.

HOUSE

OF

REPRESENTATIVES

REPORT

OF

THE

SELECT

COMMITTEE

TO

INVESTIGATE FOUNDATIONS AND COMPARABLE ORGANIZATIONS, H. REP. No. 2681, 83rd
CONG., 2nd SESS. (Dec. 16, 1954) [hereinafter REECE COMMITTEE].
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Some of these institutions support efforts to
overthrow our government and to undermine our
American way of life .... Here lies the story of
how communism and socialism are financed in the
United States ....There is evidence to show that
there is a diabolical conspiracy back of all this ....
Organizations which are primarily committed to a
given ideology have received large grants from big
foundations over many years. 115
The five-person Committee, split between three foundation
opponents and two foundation supporters, held contentious
hearings.336 The minority report attacked that "ilt not only
disagree[d] with [the majority] report but earnestly believe[d]
that it should never have been published,"3 37 stating that the
1953 Cox Report represented a fair public trial of private
foundations but that the Reece Committee's majority report
represented pre-fabricated judgments without the right for the
foundations to testify in defense.338
The majority report first defended that it favored of the role
of foundations in American society:
The Committee was and is well aware of the many
magnificent services which foundations have
rendered to the people of the United States in
many fields and many areas, particularly in
medicine, public health and science. Nothing has
occurred to change its initial conviction that the
foundation, as an institution, is desirable and
should be encouraged 339
Thereafter, the tone turned negative: "But foundations play

335.
PETERSEN COMMISSION, supra note 313, at 66. Congressman Reece sat on the
Cox Committee but only attended one of eighteen sessions. He warned the Cox
Committee in an attached paragraph to its final report that, because of the lack of
investigative time, he would seek a re-investigation. Id. at 66-67.
336.
See REECE COMMITTEE, supra note 334, at 223-24. The Reece Committee
consisted of three Republican critics and two Democratic supporters. Chairman Reece
commented, referring to the ranking minority, Democrat, member, "Mr. Hays has
assumed an attitude of aggressive suspicion and insulting distrust of the majority .... He
has said frequently that he has known in advance what the majority was going to decide."
337.
Id. at 421.
338.
See id. at 422-23.
339.
Id. at 3.
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a part in our society the importance of which can hardly be
exaggerated; and, in the course of our investigation, evidence of
very grave abuses accumulated to the point of indicating that
intervention by Congress to protect our society is badly
34
needed.""
The Reece Committee opened with the rationale for the
congressional inquiry; that the tax exemption is a form of
government subsidy that increases the burden on all non-exempt
taxpayers.3 4'
Foundations are established, concluded the
Committee, to avoid the "confiscatory" rate of estate tax and to
maintain control of family businesses.3 42 Once the family, such as
Ford, tucked its business inside the tax exempt foundation, the
company could be run predatorily without the need for profits,
thus dividends, against its competitors. 343
The Committee
contended that while Ford had not pursued such a policy, the
foundation, in carrying the name of the company, advertised with
public money to the disadvantage of its competitors.3 44
Regarding corporate established foundations and the
corresponding donations, the Reece Committee presented both
charitable supporters and critics.3 4
Labor and shareholders
criticized corporate donations as denying increased wages and
dividends respectively.3 46
Supporters responded: (1) that
corporations have a civic charitable duty; (2) that corporate
giving surpassed that of individuals, making it more valuable to
charities; (3) that, because individuals only receive dividends
reduced by corporate tax, corporate charity is cheaper than
giving by individuals; (4) that corporate charity can be used to
benefit its community, thus employees; and (5) corporate

340.
Id. "The theory behind such restrictions," according to the majority, "[was]
simply that, as exemptions are acts of grace, the government may clearly impose such
conditions on the exemptions as may be calculated to prevent abuse of the privilege and to
prevent the use of the exempted funds against the public interest." Id. at 4; see also supra
Part V (noting that the argument of inequitable burden carried forward from the 1850s).
341.
Id. at 4.
342.
See REECE COMMITTEE, supra note 334, at 6. Examples given included the Ford
Foundation, the Duke Foundation, consisting of assets of Duke Power companies, the
Reid Foundation, associated with the New York Herald-Tribune, and Meyer Foundation,
owning the Washington Post and Times-Herald. The 1916 Walsh Commission also cited
the reasons of tax avoidance and retaining control of family business for the
establishment of foundations. In terms of establishing foundations, Congress specifically
legislated, but limited, the income tax avoidance through the annual charitable deduction
ceiling.
343.
See id. at 7.
344.
See id.
345.
See id. at 12.
346.
See id.; see also WALSH COMMISSION, supra note 205, at 7434 (where Mr.
Untermyer made a similar argument).
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donations create benefits to the company, the industry, and
future employees, through earmarked grants to educational and
scientific institutions. 4 7
The Committee proffered that a
corporation cannot act charitably because it lacks the charitable
criteria of human conscience. 341
The Reece Committee's primary concern with foundations
centered on their left-leaning social engineering coupled with
their financial control over universities and board crossmembership control over media and significant corporations.3 4 9
Committee testimony and research followed closely the lines of
the 1916 Walsh Report, uncovering examples of foundation
influence over university education and media coverage. The
Committee pointed the finger at unregulated foundation
bureaucrats who "exert an influence on academic life second to no
other group" through choosing the recipients of the enormous
grant funds and through controlling the media coverage of
themselves."' The Committee concluded that:
The inherent uncertainties of research in the social
sciences, the enormous factor of indefiniteness, the
impossibility of truly experimenting to test a
conditional hypothesis before proclaiming it as a
proven conclusion, the grave danger of fallacious
results, makes it highly questionable whether
public money should be so used to promote
abandonment of institutions and ways of life which
have been found satisfactory, in favor of
questionable substitutes. 5'
The Reece Committee's majority submitted the expected
populist conclusions, stating that foundations were tax avoidance
vehicles that fostered the control of the wealth, control of public
policy and the media, and encouraged "empiricism," "moral
relativity," and "collectivist" political opinions.352 The Reece
Committee recommended a definition, and a distinct set of tax
based regulations, for private foundations in contrast to section
347.
REECE COMMITTEE, supra note 334, at 12.
348.
See id. at 12-13.
349.
See generally id. at 30-59.
350.
Id. at 37.
351.
See id. at 31. In reaching its conclusions regarding the role of foundations in
the area of social sciences, the Committee defined the scope of the term "social sciences"
as including the fields of economics, sociology, government, demography, statistics,
history, and political science. See id. at 30.
352.
See Crimm, supra note 32, at 1112; see also Brody, supra note 11, at 924.
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501(c)(3) foundations.35 3 The Reece Committee's recommended:
(1) limiting a foundation's life span from ten to twenty-five years;
(2) a director representing state government; (3) mandatory
distribution of income within two to three years; (4) restriction on
corporate control; (5) university grants given free of conditions
and limitations; (6) prohibition on political activities; and (7)
increased tax audits.354 Unlike the 1916 Walsh Committee, the
Reece Committee rejected a federal incorporation requirement
for foundations as an infringement of states' rights.5
E. Did the Reports Have Any Affect? Congress Increases the
Deduction
In 1952, during the ongoing Cox Commission's investigation,
Congress raised the deduction ceiling from fifteen to twenty
percent of adjusted gross income followed by an increase during
the ongoing Reece Committee's Report to thirty percent in
1954.
Also, the 1954 Act included the formerly rejected 1924
Senate Finance Committee proposal for the removal of the
deduction ceiling for taxpayers who gave more than ninety
percent of their income to charity in eight out of ten years. 317

353.
See REECE COMMITTEE, supra note 334, at 213. In its 1965 report, Treasury
included the same proposal, which Congress enacted in 1969.
354.
See id. at 214-22. Each of these recommendations evolved from the concerns
raised before or during the Massachusetts' Tax Commission report.
Limiting a
foundation's life evolved from the concerns of mortmain and the concerns of accumulation
raised by Presidents Madison and Grant, with this inevitable recommendation evolving
from the Massachusetts' Tax Commission minority's reasoning that what the state giveth,
the state can taketh away. The minority report stressed the state's role to ensure that the
exempt institution more efficiently employed resources than the state, which would have
provided the justification for the state appointed director. Required distribution merely
enforced the government-benefit justification for exemption posited by Dr. Eliot, accepted
by Congress and the Courts. The following three points restricting control and influence
address the concerns brought by Madison that such institutions could affect democratic
institutions. The final recommendation of increased tax audits had been proposed by the
Massachusetts' Tax Commission minority, that the state conduct annual audits to reevaluate the need and scope of an institution's exemption. See supra Part VII.
355.
The Reece Committee stated on numerous occasions that it particularly did not
support federal government encroachment into the states' domain over the regulation of
corporations. See REECE COMMITTEE, supra note 334, at 215.
356.
See Lindsey, supra note 256, at 1062-63.
357.
See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, PUB. L. No. 591 Ch. 736; 83d Cong., 2d
Sess.; H.R. 8300; 68A Stat. 1.83:
SEC. 170., Charitable, etc., contributions and gifts
(a) Allowance of deduction. (C)Unlimited deduction for certain individuals - The limitation in
subparagraph (B) shall not apply in the case of an individual if, in
the taxable year and in 8 of the 10 preceding taxable years, the
amount of the charitable contributions, plus the amount of income
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The 1952 Senate Finance
deductible increase, stated:

Committee,

justifying

the

Your Committee is of the opinion that by
increasing the 15 percent limit to 20 percent, much
needed relief will be given to colleges, hospitals,
and other organizations who are becoming more
and more dependent upon private contributors to
enable them to balance their budgets and carry on
their programs. The plight in which many of our
educational systems find themselves at the present
time is due to the fact that their endowment
income is inadequate to meet rising costs ....
Many of the smaller colleges whose alumni have
not sufficient
means
to
make
adequate
contributions are able to continue their existence
only through gifts or contributions received by one
or two prominent families in their community.
Your Committee believes that it is in the best
interest of the country to encourage private
contributions to these institutions... "'
The 1954 Act broke ground by applying the discrimination in
favor of traditional publicly supported foundations over private
foundations, established by the Act of 1943, to the maximum
allowable charitable deduction. The congressional policy for
discriminating against private foundations did not rest on
populist sentiment expressed in the Reece Committee, but rather
was justified as an offset to the rising operating costs and modest
endowment income of the public charities. 9
The 1954 Act
enacted an additional ten percent deduction, thus a total of thirty
percent, for contributions made to qualifying charities.6 0

tax (determined without regard to chapter 2, relating to tax on
self-employment income) paid during such year in respect of such
year or preceding taxable years, exceeds 90 percent of the
taxpayer's taxable income for such year,....
358.
Williams & Moorehead, supra note 241, at 2102 (quoting S. REP. No. 1584, 82 "'
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1952)).
359.
Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 163, at 337; Lindsey, supra note 237, at 1063
(citing H.R. REP. No. 83-1337 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4050, which
states: "This amendment by your committee is designed to aid these institutions in
obtaining the additional funds they need, in view of their rising costs and the relatively
low rate of return they are receiving on endowment funds.").
360.
See Lindsey, supra note 256, at 1063. The 1954 version of the Internal Revenue
Code stated, in pertinent part:
SEC. 170. Charitable, etc., contributions and gifts
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Qualifying charities for which taxpayer could take advantage of
the additional ten percent deduction included churches,
educational institutions, and hospitals. 6 ' However, Congress did
not limit private foundations from taking advantage of the
deductible ceiling elimination for taxpayers contributing more
than ninety percent of their income in eight out of ten years.
X.

1960-1970: PATMAN'S CRUSADE AGAINST THE PRIVATE
FOUNDATION

The Cox Commission and Reece Committee, like the 1916
Walsh Commission report, did not affect the increase in private
foundation, growth in their assets, or legislatively punish private
foundations. 62
The fifties economic expansion resulted in
substantially more private foundations, exceeding the thirties
and forties foundation growth trend, increasing at the average of
1,200 per year to a total of 13,000.363 In 1958, 1960, and 1962,
congressional legislation generally supported foundations,
allowing a following year carry over for excess charitable
deduction and a monthly fifty dollars deduction for educational
maintenance expenses, expanding the list of qualifying charities
for the full thirty percent deduction, though limiting to fair
market value the deduction for property contribution.164 The
(a) Allowance of deduction.
(A) Special
rule.
Any
charitable
contribution
to
(i) a church or a convention or association of churches,
(ii) an educational organization referred to in section 503(b)(2), or
(iii) a hospital referred to in section 503(b)(5), shall be allowed to
the extent that the aggregate of such contributions does not exceed
10 percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income ...
(B) General Limitation. - The total deductions under subsection (a) for
any taxable year shall not exceed 20 percent of the taxpayer's
adjusted gross income computed without regard to any net
operating loss carryback to the taxable year under section 172.
For purposes of this subparagraph, the deduction under
subsection (a) shall be computed without regard to any deduction
allowed under subparagraph (A) ....
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, PUB. L. No. 591 Ch. 736; 83d Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 8300;
68A Stat. 1.83.
361.
Lindsey, supra note 256, at 1063. In 1962, Congress expanded the list of
favored charitable foundations to include those that supported certain state colleges and
universities. Id. at 1064.
362.
See id.
363.
See Crimm, supra note 32, at 1113.
364.
See Lindsey, supra note 237, at 1063-64 (discussing the 1958, 1960, and 1962
amendments made to § 170.) In 1958, § 170(b)(3) was amended to allow a succeeding year
loss carry over of any disallowed charitable deduction while disallowing a double
deduction for interest and charitable contribution. See id. at 1063. In 1960, Congress
enacted a monthly $50 charitable deduction for educational maintenance at the primary
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growing trend for establishing private foundations led to a sixties
repeat of the fifties' populist investigations of private
foundations. 65
Because the fifties, the conservative populist
message of foundation's supporting un-American activities did
not produce the desired regulatory results; the populist
movement returned to its Walsh Commission anti-industrialist
economic message attacking "the arrogance and greed of a
wealthy, mainly East Coast, elite."3 66 The populists finally made
their mark at the decade's end.
Starting with his investigations in 1961, Congressman
Wright Patman produced eight congressional reports on private
foundation's activities, his first presented in 1962.76
His
motivations consisted of a repeat of the fifties' populist message:
foundations allowed the wealthy to abuse tax laws, obtain and
maintain control over public corporations, speculate in and
level. See id. at 1063-64. In 1962, Congress expanded the allowable 30% deduction list of
favored charitable foundations to include those that supported certain state colleges and
universities while reducing the deduction to fair market value for contributed property.
See id. at 1064.
365.
See Marsh, supra note 10, at 150-51; see also Crimm, supra note 32, at 1113
n.131 (noting that Congressman Patman based the premise of his first speech attacking
private foundations on their rapid growth).
366.
Marsh, supra note 10, at 150; see Rambler, supra note 164, at 1372 (explaining
that the congressional conservatives sought lobbying restrictions for foundations on the
grounds that such foundations were supporting a policy against the Vietnam War,
advocating the abolition of the House Un-American Activities Committee, and requesting
the admission of China to the United Nations); see also Crimm, supra note 32, at 1112
(discussing the conflicts over private foundations that occurred during the 1950s).
367.
C. Eugene Steuerle & Martin A. Sullivan, Toward More Simple and Effective
Giving: Reforming the Tax Rules for Charitable Contributions and Charitable
Organizations, 12 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 399, 423 (1995). Congressman Wright Patman was
Chair of the House Select Small Business Committee. Description of Income Tax
Provisions Relating to Private Foundations, Joint Committee on Taxation JCS-31-83 June
24, 1983 at pg. 3-4. Congressman Patman's 1960s reports included: (1) Tax-Exempt
Foundations and Charitable Trusts: Their Impact on Our Economy, Chairman's Report,
House Select Committee on Small Business, Committee Prints, Cong. Sess. 87-2, Dec. 31,
1962; (2) Tax-Exempt Foundations and Charitable Trusts: Their Impact on Our Economy,
Installment No. 2. Subcommittee Chairman's Report, House Select Committee on Small
Business, Committee Prints, Cong. Sess. 88-1, Oct. 16, 1963; (3) Tax-Exempt Foundations
and Charitable Trusts: Their Impact on Our Economy, Installment No. 3. Subcommittee
Chairman's Report, House Select Committee on Small Business, Committee Prints, Cong.
Sess. 88-2, Mar. 20, 1964; (4) Tax-Exempt Foundations and Charitable Trusts: Their
Impact on Our Economy, Installment No. 4. Subcommittee Chairman's Report, House
Select Committee on Small Business, Committee Prints, Cong. Sess. 89-2, Dec. 21, 1966;
(5) Tax-Exempt Foundations and Charitable Trusts: Their Impact on Our Economy,
Installment No. 5. Subcommittee Chairman's Report, House Select Committee on Small
Business, Committee Prints, Cong. Sess. 90-1, Apr. 28, 1967; (6) Tax-Exempt Foundations
and Charitable Trusts: Their Impact on Our Economy, Installment No. 6. Subcommittee
Chairman's Report, House Select Committee on Small Business, Committee Prints, Cong.
Sess. 90-2, Mar. 26, 1968; (7) Tax-Exempt Foundations and Charitable Trusts: Their
Impact on Our Economy, Installment No. 7. Subcommittee Chairman's Report, House
Select Committee on Small Business, Committee Prints, Cong. Sess. 91-1, June 30, 1969.
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manipulate the capital markets, and direct public policy. 368 In
1962, Congress Patman issued his initial report critical on
foundations and their activities, listing seventeen remedies,
many of which were an expanded rehash of the recommendations
of the 1916 Walsh Commission report."9 The remedies included:
(1) halting any new establishment of private foundations; (2) a
twenty-five year limit on the life of private foundations; (3)
establishment of a national regulatory agency for foundations; (4)
active enforcement by Treasury of the self-dealing rules; (5) a
restriction on engaging in business activities; (6) restriction on
borrowing or lending money; (7) a three percent share ownership
restriction of any corporation; (8) a restriction on share voting; (9)
controlling
donors'
charitable
deduction
denied
until
corresponding contributions spent for charitable purposes; (10)
requiring all contributions and capital gains be spent currently;
(11) taxing foundations' income at twenty percent; and (12)
forbidding voter registration drives. 70
In the opening statements of his first report, Congressman
Patman predicted that "the economic life of our Nation has
become so intertwined with foundations that unless something is
done about it they will hold a dominant position in every phase of
American life. 37'
In Chapter one, the report began by
summarizing that that Treasury should impose an immediate
moratorium on foundations' tax exemption based on the following
reasons:
1. Laxness and irresponsibility on the part of the
368.
See Crimm, supra note 32, at 1113-14; Marsh, supra note 10, at 150-51;
Rambler, supra note 164, at 1372. Potential control of public policy and control of the
economy can be chalked up to the issue being raised by James Madison and Ulysses
Grant. Dr. Eliot dealt with potential tax abuse in the Massachusetts Tax Commission
report. See supra Part VII(B).
369.
See HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 87TH CONG., TAX-EXEMPT
FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS: THEIR IMPACT ON OUR ECONOMY 1, 133-134

(Comm. Print 1962) [hereinafter PATMAN REPORT No. 1]. Chairman Patman specifically
recalled that, "[a]s far back as 1916, we were amply warned by the Walsh Committee of
the abuses which might well flow from the creation of these privileged, tax-exempt
entities .... Id. at 1.
370.
See PATMAN REPORT No. 1, supra note 369, at 133-34; see also Crimm, supra
note 32, at 1114 n.134 (noting that the recommendation against foundations supporting
voter registration drives was in retaliation to the Ford Foundation's grant to support
black voter registration which effected Cleveland's mayor election).
371.
PATMAN REPORT No. 1, supra note 369, at Letter of Transmittal p. v. This
proposition continued the 1916 Walsh Commission's claim against the control of the
economy by the industrialists' foundations, again calling forth the original concerns of
Presidents Madison and Grant and James Patton that exempt organizations would
accumulate capital to the point of harming democratic institutions. See supra Parts
VII(B), IX.
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Internal Revenue Service.
2. Violations of law and Treasury regulations by
far too many of the foundations encompassed in
our study.
3. The withdrawal of almost $7 billion from the
reach of tax collectors for taxable years 1951
through 1960. This amount represents the total
receipts of only 534 out of an estimated 45,124 tax
exempt foundations.
4. The rapidly increasing concentration of
economic power in foundations which-in my
view- is far more dangerous than anything that
has happened in the past in the way of
concentration of economic power.
5. Foundation-controlled enterprises possess the
money and competitive advantages to eliminate
the small businessman. 372
In support of the alleged laxness of the I.R.S. toward
auditing the regulatory violations, Chairman Patman listed
numerous non-filing and non-reporting violations committed by
substantial foundations, after which he pointing out that "[a]ny
member of this body will recognize that infractions such as these
by ordinary citizens would have the Internal Revenue Service
pursing them in force." 373
He also presented numerous
shortcomings in foundations' method of accounting used in their
annual reports, focusing on the lack of uniform accounting
procedures regarding characterization of capital gains and
income, asset valuation, and year end.374
Regarding his third justification against the tax exemption,
he put forward a tax equity argument as well as a subsidy
without representation argument.
He stated the moderate
income workers, farmers, and small businessmen were bearing
an inequitable tax burden because the wealthy's income was
growing exempt in foundations.375 He put forward that the over
372.
PATMAN REPORT No. 1, supra note 369, at 1.
373.
Id. at 3-4.
374.
Id. at 5-7.
375.
See id. at 2. This argument merely continued the argument of inequitable
burden raised in the 1850s, 1870s, and in the 1894 congressional debate by Senators
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$lbillion received by 534 tax exempt foundations in 1960 was
substantially more than that of the largest fifty banks and that
the charitable deduction led to only one-third of the national
income being taxed.376 Also, rather than subsidizing charitable
activities, the tax exemption was funding the foundation's antidemocratic propaganda, as well as speculative financial activities
and anti-competitive business practices.377
In support of his fourth argument relating to concentration
of wealth, Patman included a list of significant companies in
which foundations owned ten percent or more of the stock, and
that also either combinations of foundation stock and owner
stock or convertible stock led to further control.7 Regarding his
argument based on unfair competitive advantages, Patman
presented the example of how for profit laboratories and
engineering firms operated at a loss because exempt research
companies bid their equipment at or below cost as well as
319
specifically excluding the profit amount from the final bid price.
In the report's seventeen recommendations, Patman
presented the arguments of Julius Rosenwald for the twenty-five
year establishment limitation, being that limited life would end
the foundational bureaucracy, force accumulated funds to be
spent on charitable purposes, and re-distribute the control of
American industry.380 His recommendations ended with a call for
further reporting requirements, including: (1) publicly publishing
exemption applications and administrative decisions; (2) publicly
publishing foundations' tax returns; (3) a national registry of
public foundations; (4) disclosure of expenditure for legislative or
political activities, and advertising; and (5) description of all
activities in which commercial organizations are also engaged.38 '
The second Patman Report, presented October 16, 1963,
started with an attack against Treasury: "It is evident that
nonfeasance on the part of Treasury officials has fostered tax-free
commercial activities, violations of law and Treasury regulations,
and tax avoidance through the device of foundations."382 The
Peffer and Higgins.
376.
See id. at 4.
377.
See id. at 2, 4, 9-13.
378.
PATMAN REPORT NO. 1, supra note 369, at 8-9.
379.
See id. at 9-12.
380.
See id. at 133; Brody, supra note 11, at 921-22 (noting that the philanthropist
Julius Rosenwald, Sears, Roebuck founder, upon establishing his foundation with a
twenty-five year life, argued in the 1920s that perpetual endowments created a harm to
society, freezing funds from the present requirements of charitable institutions).
381.
See PATMAN REPORT No. 1, supra note 369, at 135.
382.

HOUSE

SELECT

COMM.

ON

SMALL

BUSINESS,

88TH

CONG.,

TAX-EXEMPT

FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS: THEIR IMPACT ON OUR ECONOMY (SECOND
INSTALLMENT), at Letter of Transmittal p. III (Comm. Print 1963) [hereinafter PATMAN
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Report focused on the unrelated but tax exempt business
activities undertaken by foundations, including security dealing,
business and credit brokers, and banking and mortgage
activities, and the corresponding self-dealing and inurement
resulting there from.383 Similar to the first report, Patman
provided numerous examples of alleged abuse by a few large
foundations.384 Patman blamed this non-compliance on the fact
that the I.R.S. did not have the zeal to pursue the violations,
evidenced by the fact that four hundred thirty-three of the five
hundred, forty-six foundations under the Committee's review had
not been audited.
However, the 1962 and 1963 Patman reports produced the
same legislative results as its predecessor 1916 Walsh
Commission report. 38
Rather than ushering in a wrath of
restriction against private foundations, in 1962 and 1964
Congress further expanded the class of favored foundations that
qualified for the full thirty percent charitable deduction. In 1962,
Congress expanded the class to include foundations that
supported state colleges and universities, and in 1964,
foundations that received substantial government or general
public support.387 The 1964 Act further liberalized the charitable

REPORT No. 2].
383.
See id. at III-IX.
384.
See id. at 12-83.
385.
See id. at 5.
386.
See Troyer, supra note 279, at 55 (suggesting that Congressman Patman's
Reports may not have attracted congressional attention because much of Congress,
including the key tax writing committee members, "detested" him).
387.
See Lindsey, supra note 237, at 1064; Marsh, supra note 10, at 149; see the
Senate Report, PUB. L. No. 88-272, Revenue Act of 1964, (S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. 59 1964) (Lexis):
For any of the nongovernmental organizations to qualify for the
additional 10-percent deduction referred to above, they must normally
receive a substantial part of their support from a governmental unit
or from direct or indirect contributions from the general public.
"Support" for this purpose does not take into account income received
by the organization from exercise of its exempt function. The reference
to direct or indirect contributions from the general public prevents
what are generally termed private foundations from qualifying for
this additional 10-percent deduction. To qualify, the organization
must receive support from at least a representative number of persons
within the community concerned.
Types of organizations which generally will in the future qualify for
this additional 10-percent deduction are those publicly or
governmentally supported museums of history, art, or science,
libraries, community centers to promote the arts, organizations
providing facilities for the support of an opera, symphony orchestra,
ballet, or repertory drama, and organizations such as the American
Red Cross, United Givers Fund, etc.
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deduction by enacting a five-year carry forward period for any
unused deduction exceeding the thirty percent threshold in the
contribution year. 8 8 The 1964 policy justification for expanding
the qualifying foundation list was to increase the "immediately
spendable contributions" to such organizations. 9
However, potentially partly influenced by the numerous
allegations presented in Patman's reports, the 1964 Act
restricted the 1954 provision that removed the deduction ceiling
for taxpayers who gave more than ninety percent of their income
to charity in eight out of ten years.
Congress limited this
provision to donations made to favored foundations qualifying
under the newly expanded criteria for the thirty percent
deduction, thus constricting the substantial deductible donations
made by the wealthy to their private foundations.3"' The Senate
388.
Williams & Moorehead, supra note 241, at 2103.
389.
Rambler, supra note 164, at 1371. But see Troyer, supra note 279, at 55 (stating
that the Ways and Means Committee, because of its members general "dissatisfaction"
and "suspicion" with private foundations, specifically excluded them from the 30%
deduction); S. Report, PUB. L. No. 88-272, Revenue Act of 1964, S. REP. NO. 88-830, Jan.
28, 1964 at 1731. (S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1964) (stating that "[t]hese latter
types of organizations frequently do not make contributions to the operating
philanthropic organizations for extended periods of time and in the meanwhile use the
funds for investments."); see also Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 163, at 337-38
(presenting that the 1964 legislation's discrimination against private non-operating
foundations may have embodied three distinct justifications. First, Congress may have
considered that non-operating foundations make fewer continuing commitments, thus
better able to manage financial planning. Second, publicly supported foundations address
immediate social needs. Thirdly, public support for a foundation expresses public
endorsement of it.).
390.
See Troyer, supra note 279, at 55-56; Hall, supra note 262, at 14 (stating that
the eventual amendment to this provision restricting its application started with an
intense lobbying of the Senate Finance Committee by the Rockefeller family to expand the
provision's benefits). While the Senate Finance Committee originally agreed to expand
the provision to encourage contributions by the wealthy, the resulting backlash from
other Senate and House members resulted in the inevitable limitation of the provision.
Troyer, supra note 279, at 58 (quoting Senators Russell Long, Albert Gore, and Eugene
McCarthy from the Senate Finance Committee dissent against Rockefeller's proposed
expansion of the deduction, "at present rates of establishment, substantial control of our
economy may soon rest in the 'dead hands' of such organizations, endangering "the free
choices presented by the marketplace and by the democratic processes of a free
government, free economy, and a free society."); see also John G. Simon, Private
Foundations as a Federally Regulated Industry: A Time for a Fresh Look?, 27 Exempt
Organization Tax Rev. 66, 70-1 (Jan. 2000) (stating that Senator Gore compared the
power of foundations to sixteenth century English churches). See supra Part VII(B)
(noting that this dissent aligns closely to that raised by Presidents Madison and Grant
and James Parton); see also supra Part III. Henry VIII seized the Catholic Church and

colleges properties and put forward the Statute of Uses for the similar reasons that
substantial control of England rested in the dead hands of the Church and that the
Catholic Church, through its colleges, affected the public policy.
391.
S. REP. No. 830 Part 2; 88th Cong.. 2d Sess.; H.R. 8363. Supplemental Report
Technical Explanation Of The Bill [To Accompany H.R. 8363] January 31, 1964, 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1673 at 1732-33:
10. Denial of unlimited charitablecontributions deduction with respect
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Finance Committee justified this discrimination with two
arguments.3 2 First, the Finance Committee stated that private
foundations accumulated their income, thus thwarting the
charitable expenditure justification for expanding the qualifying
foundations criteria. Second, the Finance Committee stated that
the benefits of the control of private foundation investments
inured to the principal contributors.
XI. THE TREASURY REPORTS

In 1964, the Senate Finance Committee requested Treasury
to undertake its own study of foundations.393 Treasury limited its
to gifts to private foundations...
(b)... With respect to future years, the unlimited charitable
contribution deduction will take into account charitable contributions
to: churches; schools; hospitals; specified medical research
organizations; certain organizations affiliated with State colleges or
universities; Federal, State, or local governmental units, if the
contribution or gift is made for exclusively public purposes; and
charitable contributions generally to religious, charitable, scientific,
literary, or educational organizations or those for the prevention of
cruelty to children or animals. However, in this latter case, the
charitable organization must receive a substantial part of its support
from a governmental unit or from direct or indirect contributions from
the general public .... The reference to direct or indirect contributions
from the general public is designed to prevent gifts to private
foundations from qualifying for this unlimited deduction. To qualify,
the organization must receive support from at least a representative
number of persons within the community concerned.
392.
S. REP. No. 830 Part 2; 88th Cong. 2d Sess.; H.R. 8363. Supplemental Report
Technical Explanation of the Bill [To Accompany H.R. 8363] January 31, 1964, 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1673 at 1732:
10. Denial of unlimited charitablecontributions deduction with respect
to
gifts
to
private
foundations...

393.

(b) General reasons for provision. - Your committee has added a
provision to the bill making the unlimited charitable contribution
deduction available only with respect to contributions to publicly
supported organizations for much of the same reasons that both the
House and your committee only make the extra 10-percent deduction
available in the case of these organizations. Your committee believes
that the special advantage of the unlimited charitable contribution
deduction should not be made available in the case of these private
foundations because frequently contributions to foundations do not
find their way into operating philanthropic endeavors for extended
periods of time. In the meanwhile, the funds are invested and the
advantages arising from control of these investments are likely to
inure to the principal contributors to the foundations. Thus, your
committee concluded that if the 20- or 30-percent limitations with
respect to charitable giving are to be removed for those desiring to
make large contributions there should be no question that the bulk of
the funds involved, within a reasonable period of time, are devoted to
the charitable and philanthropic purposes.
Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 367, at 423.
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study to private foundations and non-exempt trusts, defining a
private foundation as an organization per section 501(c)(3) other
than publicly or governmentally supported organizations,
churches, schools, organizations to test public safety and finally,
non-exempt trusts that pay or permanently set aside amounts for
certain charitable purposes." 4 Treasury reviewed a sample of
thirteen hundred foundations' returns, including all foundations
with assets of more than ten million dollars, and consulted
various interested parties including the Internal Revenue
Service,
Justice
Department,
a group
of foundation
representatives, and a group of attorneys with special experience
and expertise in the field." 5 Presented in 1965, the Treasury
Report began Part 1 by examining the relationship of private
foundations and the government:
Private philanthropic organizations can possess
important
characteristics
which
modern
government necessarily lacks. They may be manycentered, free of administrative superstructure,
subject to the readily exercised control of
individuals with widely diversified views and
interests. Such
characteristics
give
these
organizations great opportunity to initiate thought
and action, to experiment with new and untried
ventures, to dissent from prevailing attitudes, and
to act quickly and flexibly. Precisely because they
can be initiated and controlled by a single person
or a small group, they may evoke great intensity of
interest and dedication of energy. These values, in
themselves, justify the tax exemptions and
deductions
which 9 the
law
provides
for
6
activity.
philanthropic
Commenting on foundations unique role within society,
Treasury found: "Private philanthropy plays a special and vital
role in our society. Beyond providing for areas into which
394.

STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 89TH CONG., TREASURY DEPARTMENT ON

PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS at 3 (Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter 1965 TREASURY REPORT].
Four years later, Congress included a slightly expanded class of non-private foundations

in codifying what did not constitute a private foundation. See I.R.C. § 501 (1969).
Treasury's definition merely encapsulated the previous definition and classes included
since the 1943 Act regarding which foundations Congress did not subject to the more
onerous reporting requirements and allowed to take advantage of the full 30% charitable
deduction. Id.
395. Troyer, supra note 279, at 56.
396. 1965 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 394, at 12.

BYRNES-MACRO
BYRNES-MACRO

11/11/2004 1:21 PM
11/11/2004 1:21 PM

570 HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAXLAW JOURNAL [Vol. IV
government cannot or should not advance (such as religion) ...
," private foundations are "available even to those of relatively
restricted means, they enable individuals or small groups to
establish new charitable endeavors and to express their own
bents, concerns, and experience. In doing so, they enrich the
pluralism of our social order."39 7 Finally, turning to private
foundation's role within the realm of charity:
Private foundations have also preserved fluidity
and provided impetus for change within the
structure of American philanthropy. Operating
charitable organizations tend to establish and
work within defined patterns. The areas of their
concern become fixed, their goals set, their major
efforts directed to the improvement of efficiency
and effectiveness within an accepted framework.
Their funds are typically consigned to definite and growing - budgets. The assets of private
foundations, on the other hand, are frequently free
of commitment to specific operating programs or
projects; and that freedom permits foundations
relative ease in the shift of their focus of interest
and their financial support from one charitable
area to another. New ventures can be assisted,
new areas explored, new concepts developed, new
causes advanced. Because of its unique flexibility,
then, the private foundation can constitute a
powerful instrument for evolution, growth, and
improvement in the shape and direction of
charity.39 8
Next, the Treasury Report countered the three primary
allegations against foundations, also raised in Congressman
Patman's Committee hearings.39 9 As to the first allegation that
foundations delay the expenditure of contributions on charitable
activities, Treasury concluded that this criticism could be dealt
with by specifically tailored regulation.4 0
Regarding the
allegation that the foundation sector had grown to represent too
significant a portion of the national economy, Treasury did not

397.
398.
399.
note 383,
400.

Id.
Id.
Williams & Moorehead, supra note 241, at 2106; 1965 Treasury Report, supra
at 12.
1965 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 394, at 5.
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find a factual basis. Treasury stated that foundations were
themselves dealing with the allegation that they represent a
dangerous concentration of economic and social power.4"' Finally,
the Treasury reported that it had found serious abuse only in a
minority of foundations.
In Part II, Treasury presented six remedies to counter the
general criticisms associated with the intimate structural ties
among foundations, their donors and the donor's relations, and
affiliated for-profit corporations.4 0 ' First, Treasury examined its
enforcement of the 1950 arm's length standard.
Listing twelve
examples, it concluded that the standards application was
tenuous and costly, resulting from the ambiguous terminology of
the regulation.0
Thus Treasury, like the Ways & Means
Committee of 1950, suggested that all self-dealing be prohibited,
rather than regulated at arm's length, but for reasonable
compensation for services performed.4 0 Also, Treasury proposed
prohibitions against three specific financial transactions:
borrowing for investments; making loans; and speculative
trading and investments, though it concluded that only a small
group of foundations undertook these.4 °7
Second, Treasury presented a tailored regulation for the
general allegation that foundations delay the donor's charitable
expenditures, though recognizing that in practice but a few
foundations did not pay out substantially all their income.4 "8
Treasury noted the assertion that the delay could be justified
because it allowed uncommitted funds that could be deployed
401.
Williams & Moorehead, supra note 241, at 2106.
402.
1965 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 394, at 14.
403.
Crimm, supra note 3, at 789. The 1965 Treasury Report in part III dealt with
specific tax planning concerns, such as tax-free bailout of corporate earnings, not
discussed herein.
404.
1965 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 394, at 6, 15-23.
405.
Id. at 6, 18.
406.
Id. at 21; see id. at 18, 23 (Treasury also justified the ban in that in
Commonwealth trustee fiduciary law, trustees are barred from dealing with the trust as
well as that the loss of opportunity to employ funds for personal purposes would result in
their being used for charitable purpose). Congress adopted this recommendation in the
1969 Act, I.R.C. § 4941. See CONF. REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, at 2392-93.
407.
Williams & Moorehead, supra note 241, at 2100 (citing 1965 TREASURY REPORT,
supra note 394, at 45-54); see Crimm, supra note 3, at 789.
408.
1965 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 394, at 23-30. The Treasury noted that in
1962, only 25% of foundations did not charitably distribute all their income, and that
many of that 25% had distributed substantial portions of their income or could have been
included in the 75% had their 1962 ear-marked distributions actually paid out in 1963
been counted. Id. However, because most foundations met the requirement of the
distribution of their earned income, the Treasury concluded that such a requirement
would affect few of them adversely. Id. at 26-27.
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from one charitable area to another, as well as creating an even
larger endowment for future charitable use.4" 9 However, the
Treasury concluded that the non-operating foundation's long
period of retention of both contributions and the investment
income in relation thereto did not align with the policy of
forgoing government revenue in exchange for charitable
expenditure toward the public welfare.41 ° It noted that the
current rule against accumulation did not even address the
accumulation of contributions or the growth in the actual asset
base.4 1' Treasury concluded that enforcement of the current rule,
like enforcement of the present self-dealing41 2arm's length rule,
was administratively burdensome and costly.
Thus, addressing the accumulation of both income and asset
base and seeking to enforce the policy of exemption for charitable
expenditure, Treasury proposed that non-operating foundations
be required to distribute annually the greater of either their
annual income or a minimum fixed percent of their assets,
suggested to be in a range of three to three-and-a-half percent.4 13
The minimum fixed percent proposal range evolved from what
Treasury concluded would be the equivalent income earned by a
comparable organization's endowment, such as a University.4 "4
Treasury recommended that Congress require non-operating
foundations' annual distribution be only to publicly supported
charitable
organizations,
privately
supported
operating
organizations, direct expenditure for charitable purpose and the
purchase of assets used for charitable activities."'
Third, Treasury turned its attention to foundations'
unrelated businesses and the criticism of donor's continued
control of family business interests.4 16 Treasury noted three
concerns: (1) unfair competitive, tax exempt advantage; (2) poor
investment return; and (3) the aggravation of the issues of selfdealing and lack of charitable expenditure.
Regarding unfair advantage, Treasury noted four issues.
First, a tax exempt's taxable businesses could reduce their tax
base through selling assets to the tax exempt entity, thereafter
409.
Id. at 24, 28.
410.
Id. at 28.
411.
See Troyer, supra note 279, at 57.
412.
Id.
413.
1965 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 394, at 28-29. Congress adopted this
recommendation in the 1969 Act, I.R.C. § 4942. See CONF. REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391 at 2395-96.
414.
1965 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 394, at 28.
415.
Id. at 26-27.
416.
Troyer, supra note 279, at 57.
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making deductible payments to the tax exempt entity, reducing
the business' earnings and creating tax free income for the
foundation.417 Second, because donations were deductible, a
foundation's founder could contribute deductible, before tax
dollars, to the foundation and thereafter capitalize his
businesses, whereas ordinary taxpayers invested with nondeductible, after-tax dollars.418 Third, a foundation's reserves
grow tax free allowing it "to subsidize its businesses during
periods of difficulty and to expand them during periods of
4 9 Fourth, because foundation's businesses lack
growth.""
a
shareholder's demand for distributed profits, they
420 can more
aggressively invest in modernization and expansion.
Regarding poor investment return, Treasury performed a
survey regarding foundation holdings of more than twenty and
fifty percent of a company.4 2' Treasury concluded that in both
instances, the average yields were far below the Dow Jones
average, with a significant portion of the holdings having no
yield, with no corresponding benefit in share appreciation.422
Treasury determined that these substantial holdings delayed
charitable expenditure, thus were not aligned with the policy of
providing for social welfare.4 3
Finally, Treasury argued that a foundations involvement in
multiple businesses required the foundation's directors devote
their attention to the businesses rather than the exploration and
development of alternative social solutions, the primary
justification for their favored tax position.424 Consequently,
Treasury stated: "Business may become the end of the
organization;
charity
an insufficiently
considered
and
mechanically accomplished afterthought. 4 25 Thus, continued the
report, the foundation's directors become indistinguishable from
a self-perpetuating public company's management. 421
Therefore, Treasury recommended that foundations be
limited to a twenty percent proportional ownership of a
corporation conducting business not substantially related to the

417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.

1965 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 394, at 32.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 33.
Troyer, supra note 279, at 57-58.
Id. at 58.
See id.
1965 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 394, at 35.
Id.
Id.
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exempt purpose.427 In conjunction with this recommendation, to
deal with the criticism levied at family foundations receiving
dividend stock while the family retained the controlling voting
stock and obtained a deduction, Treasury proposed the deferral of
the controlling donor's deduction until either the donor
relinquished
control of the business or the charity disposed of
8
it.

42

In concluding these remedies for the major abuses, Treasury
suggested that twenty-five years after establishment, Congress
mandate that the foundation's governing body should consist of
no more than twenty-five percent of donors and their relations so
that the foundation could acquire new perspectives, stemming
institutional bureaucracy. 429 Ending the Report, Treasury called
for Congress to establish civil penalties for non-compliance with
filing and reporting requirements because the current sanctions
called for criminal sanctions, to severe for implementation in
most cases.430
On December 21, 1966 Patman released his fourth Report,
continuing the themes of the previous ones.43'
Patman's
criticisms included: (1) foundations' losing funds in speculative
432
investments rather than using them for charitable expenditure;
(2) greater than fifty percent of income accumulated rather than
used for charitable expenditure;4 3 (3) approximately ten percent
of receipts expensed rather than used for charitable
expenditure; 4 4 (4) improper charitable expenditure for personal
and political use; 435 and (5) tax dodging. 4 6 Patman claimed his
committee's prodding led to two results: (1) the 1965 Treasury
Report, but that the report represented only a minimum effort to
curb foundations' abuses;
and (2) seven foundation audits leading
437
to tax assessments.
427.
Id. at 36. Treasury recommended that Congress continue the exceptions
granted under the 1950 Act, such as used clothing stores and employee cafeterias.
Congress adopted this recommendation in the 1969 Act, I.R.C. § 4943. See CONF. REP.
No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391 at 2396-97.
428.
1965 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 394, at 41-42.
429.
Id. at 56-57. Treasury's approach was probably in response to the persistent
calls for the termination of a foundation's life after a period of time.
430.
Id. at 64.
431.
HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 89TH CONG., TAX-EXEMPT
FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS: THEIR IMPACT ON OUR ECONOMY (FOURTH
INSTALLMENT) (Comm. Print 1966) [hereinafter PATMAN REPORT No. 4].

432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 6.
See PATMAN REPORT No. 4, supra note 431, at 10.
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XII. PETERSEN COMMISSION

In response to the 1965 Treasury Report, John D.
Rockefeller, III commissioned Peter G. Peterson to chair an
independent investigation of foundations (the "Petersen
Commission").43 8 Though it was published in 1970, the Petersen
Commission delivered its findings and recommendations to
Congress during the 1969 hearings.43 9 The Petersen Commission
was charged with providing an evaluation report and with
making recommendations regarding the role for foundations in
society. The Petersen Commission chose to examine the twentytwo thousand grant-making foundations that received their
contributions from one person or small group of persons,
excluding operating and publicly supported foundations.44
In its two hundred, seventy-seven page report, the Petersen
Commission first stated the popular criticisms of foundations,
that they:
(1) were tax avoidance vehicles for the wealthy;
(2) represented the Ivy League establishment's
perpetual concentration of power through self
perpetuating boards;
(3) were heavily involved in politics, not charity;
(4) promoted extremist ideology, be it left or right;
(5) squandered their charitable money on high
expense accounts and salaries; and
(6) accumulated their earnings rather than spent
them on charity.4 4'
The Petersen Commission next charged that no data and
information had been collected to either support or refute the
criticisms; finding that no Committee, Commission, or
government agency had undertaken relevant studies to
determine the validity of criticisms. 42 Instead, it found that the
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.

Crimm, supra note 32, at 1117-18
Id. at 1118.
See PETERSEN COMMISSION, supra note 313, at 39, 48.
Id. at 4.
See id.

BYRNES-MACRO
BYRNES-MACRO

11/11/2004 1:21 PM
11/11/2004 1:21 PM

576 HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAXLAW JOURNAL [Vol. IV
criticisms were drawn from
mere anecdotes that they had not
443
been checked for validity.
The Petersen Commission responded that "The main
financial abuses charged against foundations spring, in essence,
from too clever an exploitation of their advantages ....
[a]
donor's ability to control a foundation is the precondition that
makes financial abuses potentially possible."444 The potential
abuses are two fold. First, the donor may overvalue donations to
receive a greater tax deduction.445 Second, the donor may receive
financial benefits from use of the foundation's assets.446
The Petersen Commission undertook two studies to
determine the extent of tax avoidance abuse. 447
First, it
examined five hundred Form 990-A information returns upon
which all potential self-dealing transaction must be reported.448
Secondly, it employed Arthur Andersen to survey anonymously
two hundred, twelve accountants concerning their impression of
self-dealing among small foundations. 449 The data evidenced that
in only approximately ten percent of both large and small
foundations did any potential self-dealing transactions occur. 411
Thus, the Petersen Commission concluded that while some selfdealing abuse occurs, it is in very limited situations.4 1' Regarding
abusive administrative expenses, the results of the Arthur
Andersen survey found that only five percent of accountants
perceived potential abuse, and that on average, administrative
expenses were only 2.9% of grant expenditures.45 2 Finally, in
grant making, only eight percent of accountants perceived
potential abuse of grants being made in favor of donors or their
related parties.453
The Petersen Commission next turned to the two primary
policy criticisms of foundations. From a tax policy perspective,
tax incentives for charitable donations are inequitable and create
elitism to the detriment of democratic pluralism.45 4 Wealthier
taxpayers in higher tax brackets cost the government more in

443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.

Id.
Id. at 55.
Id.
PETERSEN COMMISSION, supra note 313, at 56.
See id. at 58.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 59.
PETERSEN COMMISSION, supra note 313, at 87.
See id. at 61.
Id. at 12.
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subsidy for each tax dollar donated than lower bracket
taxpayers."' Correspondingly, wealthier taxpayers have a lower
cost of donation. By example, a dollar donated by a taxpayer in a
thirty-five percent costs the government thirty-five cents and
that taxpayer the remainder after tax of sixty-five cents; whereas
the same dollar donated from a taxpayer in a fifteen percent
bracket costs the government fifteen cents and the taxpayer
eighty-five cents. Elitism results from the lost government
revenue that would have been spent by the elected
representatives but instead is allocated by private parties.
Secondly, from the economic policy perspective, the Petersen
Commission noted that critics attacked the claim that private
charity is more efficient and more committed than government.
Critics claimed that efficiency is reduced by private actors
pursuing similar, redundant goals. Also, charitable expenditure
is diverted to public relations and fund raising, activities
unnecessary for government.
In response to these two criticisms, the Petersen
Commission found that foundations perform a number of
activities better than government as well as undertake activities
that government cannot.4 "8 Also, the Petersen Commission
argued that these activities are a valuable and necessary element
of public service. 459 First and foremost, the Petersen Commission
concluded that foundations provided the venture capital and
commercial planning to create social laboratories from which new
ideas and social innovations can be tested. 6 ° Second, because
foundations acted as private parties, they operated by the
efficiency and risk standards of the commercial sector.4 6'
Regarding social programs, the Petersen Commission put
forward that foundations may pick controversial or sensitive
topics to study that government, due to political minorities, may
not.462 Examples included the study of illegal drugs and public
school assessment programs. 463 Also, foundations may choose a
community to experiment with, and collect results from, without
the political pressure to roll out program expenditure to all

455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.

See id.
See id.
Id.
PETERSEN COMMISSION, supra note 313 at 127.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

127-31.
15, 127.
15.
127.
127-28.
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congressional districts.4 64 Foundations may perform long-term
studies in a selected roll out of communities, whereas elected
officials are subject to producing results by the upcoming
election.
Foundations have the flexibility to undertake more
costly approaches to issues as well as quickly write off programs
that do not achieve results.46 6 Finally, foundations provide a
check for and against government by providing the required
capital to study current government programs.46 7
The Petersen Commission recommended a few items for
foundations to employ in order to improve their efficiency and
public image. In addressing efficiency, the recommendations
included forming foundational associations for communication
and sharing of information, as well as smaller foundations that
cannot afford full time staff hiring outside experts as
consultants.4 8 In addressing public perception, it suggested that
foundations consider relocating from New York and expanding
their boards beyond Northeast members. 9
The Petersen Commission recommended that government
expand tax incentives to increase charitable contributions,
especially amongst the non-wealthy. 47° The result, it proposed,
would democratize philanthropy more and also make up the
deficits of what society requires of philanthropic expenditure.
The Commission agreed in principle with varying refinements of
the 1969 reform, including expanded reporting, minimum
distribution and prohibition on self-dealing transactions.4 7'
XIII.

THE 1969 ACT

In January 1969, Treasury Secretary Joseph Barr testified
to Congress about the broad tax avoidance by wealthy
taxpayers. 472 This testimony, coupled with the 1965 Treasury
Report and publicity garnered by Congressman Patman's
continuing crusade, led to congressional mistrust and action
against private foundations. 473 The 1969 Tax Reform House
Report began with an argument that the tax system created an
inequitable result:
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.

PETERSEN COMMISSION, supra note 313, at 127.
Id.
Id. at 127-28.
Id. at 129.
See id. at 131-32, 134-35.
See PETERSEN COMMISSION, supra note 313, at 132.
See id. at 145.
See id. at 147-59.
See Troyer, supra note 279, at 59.
See id. at 61.
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Increasingly, in recent years taxpayers with
substantial incomes have found ways of gaining
tax advantages from provisions placed in the code
primarily to aid some limited segment of the
economy. In fact, in many cases they have found
ways to pile one advantage on top of another. Your
committee believes that this is an intolerable
situation .... Only by sharing the tax burden on a
fair basis is it possible to keep the tax burden at a
level which is tolerable for all taxpayers.4 74
The consequences of the inequitable result, the House
reasoned, undermined the self-assessment system. In that the
self-assessment system relied on the cooperation of taxpayers,
inequitable result led to a loss of taxpayer confidence, which in
turn caused a loss of morale and thus, non-compliance.47 As
evidence of the inequitable result, the House presented testimony
that one hundred, fifty-four taxpayers with income over two
hundred thousand dollars, including twenty-one taxpayers with
incomes over one million, did not pay tax.4 77 The itemized
deduction constituted the primary cause of the wealthy's tax base
reduction.7
Correspondingly, the charitable deduction played
the most significant4 79deduction, in particular the donation of
appreciated property.
Senate Finance Committee Chairman Russell Long, in his
opening statement in support of the Conference Committee's bill,
stated:
[WIhen the Finance Committee began public
hearings on the Tax Reform Act of 1969 I referred
to the bill as '368 pages of bewildering complexity.'
It is now 585 pages.... Much of this complexity
stems from the many sophisticated ways wealthy
individuals-using the best advice that money can
buy-have found ways to shift their income from
high tax brackets to low ones, and in many

474.
that the
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.

H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1645. Note
maximum federal tax rate in 1969 was 70%. See id. at 1647.
See id. at 1654.
See id.
Id. at 1653.
See id.
See id. at 1653-54.
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instances to make themselves completely tax free.
It takes complicated amendments to end
complicated devices.48
Approximately one-third of the 1969 Tax Reform Act dealt
with tax exempt organizations,"' by which it codified the
definitions of a private foundation and an operating foundation,
enacted numerous regulations recommended by the 1965
Treasury Report that should apply to private foundations, levied
an excise tax on private foundations to pay for the cost of I.R.S.
tax exempt audits and expanded the reporting requirements and
regulations of all tax exempt organizations, increased the
charitable deduction to fifty percent but repealed the unlimited
deduction and modified several provisions regarding the
contribution of appreciated property. However, the Conference
Committee rejected the Senate's proposal to limit the private
foundation's tax exemption to forty years, the most damaging
initiative from the perspective of the private foundations.482
A. Codificationof the Private FoundationDefinition
In that since the 1943 Act, the congressional practice had
been to draw legislative distinctions regarding reporting,
regulations, and the charitable deduction ceiling, between
charitable foundations that fit into the favored classes and all
other foundations, Congress' enactment of the private foundation
definition constituted the mere formality of codifying that
accepted practice. The House presented a default codification for
private foundations, being all section 501(c)(3) organizations
unless the organization fell into one of a defined set of favored
classes.4 83
The favored class distinctions included: (1)
organizations for which the thirty percent individual deduction
applied; 4 4 (2) broadly publicly-supported organizations (including
membership organizations); (3) supporting organizations
operated exclusively for the benefit of one or more organizations
480.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 91-782 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, at
2490.
481.
Williams & Moorehead, supra note 241, at 2103-04.
482.
See S. REP. No. 91-552 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, at 2052.
483.
See H.R. REP. NO. 91-413 (1969), reprintedin 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, at 168586.
484.
The deduction was subsequently increased to 50% under the 1969 Tax Reform
Act. See S. REP. No. 91-552, reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2033.
The
organizations previously covering this class included "(1) churches, (2) schools, (3)
hospitals, (4) fund-raisers for schools, (5) States and subdivisions, and (6) publicly
supported charities." Id. at 2084.
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described above; and (4) public safety testing organizations.4 85
The second and third classes represented an expansion of the
scope of the favored foundation class.
The House's second class of broadly publicly-supported
organizations included as examples of intended beneficiaries of
favored treatment symphony societies, garden clubs, alumni
associations, Boy Scouts, and Parent-Teacher Associations.486
The proposed amendments to this class' definition established
ceilings for these organizations' income and support regarding
investments and disqualified persons to "insure that the
organization is responsive to the needs of the public." 487 First, no
more than one-third of their annual support could be generated
by gross investment income."' Second, at least one-third of their
support must be generated from sources other than disqualified
persons such as from gifts, grants, contributions, membership
fees, and gross receipts from admissions. 48 9
The Senate proposal for this class, which was eventually
accepted by the Conference Committee, expanded the definition
and application of support to take into account income cycles and
unusual grants, but limited the calculation of support by
excluding the income derived from persons providing either more
than $5,000 or more than one-percent of that support. 490

The

Senate proposed expanding the definition of support to include
amounts received from the exercise or performance of the exempt
purpose except from unrelated business income. Finally, the
Senate proposed that the level of public support should be tested
annually based on a four-year running average, as well as
allowing an exception from the strict application of this test for
unusual grants or bequests.4"'
The House's third class of supporting organizations included
as examples religious organizations other than churches, trusts
that had been organized and operated for a specific school and
were controlled in connection with such school, and university
492
presses.
The Senate expanded this class to include situations
in which the supporting organization benefited more than one
educational institution. 493 The only justification for this new class
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.

H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at 1686.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See S. REP. NO. 91-552 (1969), at 2086-87.
See id. at 2086.
H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, at 1686.
S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 2087.
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must be derived from the Senate's stated reason for the
codification of the definition of a private foundation, that "certain
other organizations presently in the 20-percent category
generally do not give rise to the problems which have led to the
restrictions and limitations described above."494
B. Codificationof the OperatingFoundationDefinition
The Senate justified delineating an "operating" foundation
that lacked public support from the substantially grant making
private foundation because the operating foundation employed
most its income and assets directly in the exercise of its
educational, charitable, and religious purposes themselves.9
This class of foundation received some of the favored benefits of
non-private foundations and some of the disfavored treatment
applying to private foundations, described further below. By
example, the operating foundation qualified for the proposed fifty
percent charitable deduction as well as to receive grants from
private foundations, but suffered the proposed excise tax and
required minimum distribution.4 "6
The House proposed the definition for operating foundations
as an organization for which the substantial portion of its income
is spent directly upon the active conduct of its exempt purposes
or functions and that it also met one of two alternative tests.497
To meet the first alterative test, the foundation employed
substantially more than half its assets toward its exempt
activities or functionally related business. 4 9 8 To meet the second
alterative test, the foundation either received substantially all of
its support from a minimum of five independent exempt
organizations of which no one tax exempt organization
contributed more than twenty-five percent of that support, or
494.
Id. at 2084; see Rambler, supra note 164, at 1377-78 (noting that the 1969 Act's
hearings did not address the subject of the new class of supporting organizations).
495.
See S. REP. No. 91-552, at 2088; H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at 1687. The "operating"
foundation was first described in the 1964 legislation in that it qualified for the unlimited
charitable contribution deduction but not for the 30% deduction. See Troyer, supra note
279, at 55.
496.
See S. REP. No. 91-552, at 2088.
497.
H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at 1687. The House added that a substantial portion of
income generally meant 85% of the foundation's income. Id. at 1688.
498.
See id. at 1687. The House stated that 65% qualified as employing substantially
more than 50% of the foundation's assets. Id. The House included specific examples of
organizations that met this first alternative test, being "Callaway Gardens (a
horticultural and recreational area for the use of the public at Pine Mountain, Georgia),
Colonial Williamsburg [the Inn and Lodge at Colonial Williamsburg are separately
incorporated taxable entities, but are owned by the foundation for the convenience of the
general public visiting Williamsburg] and Jackson Hole [which operates functionally
related business in connection with public parks and its exempt purposes]." Id. at 1688.
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received substantial support from the general public.9
The Senate included a third alternative test to address
situations in which a small endowment cannot meet the income
needs of an operating foundation's personal services, presenting
examples of Longwood Gardens, Sleepy Hollow Restoration, and
research organizations. 00 To meet this third alternative test, the
foundation must not maintain an endowment larger than
adequate to meet its current operating expenses.5 0 ' To determine
the adequacy of its endowment, the foundation must use a set
rate of return, proposed as eighty percent of the minimum
required distribution of private foundations, upon its assets not
employed directly to the active conduct of its exempt purpose.
The Conference Committee reduced the set rate of return to
sixty-six and two-thirds of the private foundation's minimum
required distribution93
C. New and Amended Regulation
Congress,
based
on
the
1965
Treasury
Report
recommendations, amended several aspects of the Code's sections
regulations applying only to private foundation, and added new
ones. First, the House proposed limiting the tax exemption by
imposing a seven and a half percent excise tax on foundation's
investment income that private foundations may share in the
nation's tax burden." 4 The Conference Committee characterized
the tax an excise tax and reduced the amount to four percent.0
Second, in line with the 1965 Treasury Report recommendation,
rather than testing transactions against the arm's length
standard, Congress prohibited all self-dealing between private
foundations and their substantial contributors.
Third, in
response to the 1965 Treasury Report's recommendations against
the accumulation of a private foundation's income, Congress
499.
See id. at 1687. The House stated that 85% would constitute substantial
support. See id. at 1688. The House also included examples of organizations that met
this test, being "learned societies, associations of libraries, and organizations which have
developed an expertise in certain substantive areas and which provide for the
independent granting of funds and direction of research in those specified substantive
areas." Id. at 1687.
500.
See S. REP. No. 91-552, at 2089.
501.
See id.
502.
See id.
503.
Id. (discussing the Conference Committee establishing 6% as the minimum
distribution for private foundations, thus applying 4% for operating foundations to their
endowments).
504.
See H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, at 1663-64.
505.
See CONF. REP. No. 91-782 (1969).
506.
See CONF. REP. NO. 91-782, at 2392-93.
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mandated a minimum distribution for charitable purposes of a
private foundation's income."' Fourth, addressing the continuing
criticisms associated with the control of family companies,
Congress placed a twenty-percent restriction on the holdings of
private businesses."' Fifth, to halt the wealthy from using their
private foundations for investment purposes, Congress tightened
the rules regarding financial speculation. 9
Sixth, Congress
imposed a tax on political and lobbying activities.5 1 ° Seventh,
Congress imposed new reporting requirements on all
foundations, but religious ones."' Finally, Congress raised the
deduction ceiling to fifty percent, limiting it in certain situations
for private foundation, and phased out the unlimited deduction
for the wealthy taxpayers.512
D. Limited Life
The most radical proposal from the private foundations'
perspective consisted of the Senate's attempt to limit the tax
exemption of private foundations to forty years." 3 The 1916
Walsh Commission, Reece Committee and Congressman
Patman's first report carried the message, but Senator Albert
Gore brought the proposal to bear on the Senate Floor.1 4 The
Finance Committee Report based the need for the limitation on
two factors. First, the Finance Committee, certainly relying
upon Congressman Patman's reports and testimony, stated that
private foundations, because of their increasing concentration of
economic power, could manipulate both the private economy and

507.
See CONF. REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, at
2395; 1965 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 394, at 28-29.
508.
See CONF. REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, at
2396-97;; 1965 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 383, at 36. Both the Senate and House
adopted Treasury's justifications nearly verbatim.
509.
CONF. REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, at
2397-98. The House proposed levying a complete confiscation of investments made "in
such a manner as to jeopardize the carrying out of any of its exempt purposes" through
imposing upon them a 100% tax, as well as punishing the managers who made them by
imposing upon them a 50% tax. Id.
510.
CONF. REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, at
2398-99.
511.
CONF. REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, at
2400-01; 1965 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 383, at 64.
512.
CONF. REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, at
2406-07.
513.
S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, at 205253.
514.
Troyer, supra note 279, at 62; see 1965 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 383, at
56-57 (in which it called for a different solution whereby, after 25 years, the donor and
donor's family could consist of no more than 25% of the foundation's governing board).
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governmental decisions.
Second, the Senate distinguished the government's grant of
tax exemption from the grant of the tax deduction for
contributions." 6 The government granted both the tax exemption
and tax deduction based on the policy of government benefit. A
foundation met its exemption obligation under this policy by
employing its income for its charitable purpose. However, the
Finance Committee pointed out that, in order for the foundation
to meet the obligation as regards the charitable deduction, at
some point the actual charitable corpus must be expended on the
charitable purpose. The Finance Committee proposed that after
forty years, a private foundation would lose its tax exempt status
unless it had either morphed itself into an operating foundation
or public charity.5 17 Senator Walter Mondale led the floor fight in
soundly rejecting this proposal. 8
E. PrivateFoundation'sExcise Tax
The Ways and Means Committee, proposing a tax on
investment income, aligned to the arguments proffered by
exemption critics of the 1850s-1890s, stating: "Your committee
believes that since the benefits of government are available to all,
the costs should be borne, at least to some extent, by all of those
able to pay. Your committee believes that this is as true for
private foundations as it is for taxpayers generally." 51 9 Second,
the Ways and Means Committee justified the proposal based
upon Treasury's need to cover foundations' audit costs, that
Treasury could ensure that foundations employed their funds for
their charitable purposes.
The House thus proposed a 71/2
percent tax on foundations' net investment income. The Senate
Finance Committee accepted the second Ways and Means
justification for an audit fee, but rejected the first based on the
theory that a tax on investment income would infringe upon the
policy of charitable tax exemption granted to foundations.12' The
Senate thus proposed an excise tax upon foundations' noncharitable assets of one-fifth of one percent to create an audit
515.
S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, at 2052.
516.
Id.
517.
Id.
518.
Troyer, supra note 279, at 62.
519.
H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, at 1663;
see supra Parts V, VII(B) and also exemption proponent Senator Hill's remarks in 1894 at
Part VIII.
520.
H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, at 1663.
521.
S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, at 2053-
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fund for Treasury.522 The Conference Committee adopted the
House's proposal of a tax on investment income, though
compromising the rate down from 71/ percent to four percent, but
in order to preserve the policy of charitable tax exemption, called
it an excise tax.123
F. PrivateFoundation'sSelf-Dealing
As to self-dealing, Congress adopted the Treasury's
recommendation to prohibit certain transactions between a
foundation and its disqualified persons. The Ways and Means
Committee used Treasury's justification that the arm's length
standard required "disproportionately great enforcement efforts,
resulting in sporadic and uncertain effectiveness of the
provisions" and that Treasury and the Courts were reluctant to
apply the loss of tax exemption sanction. 2 ' The Senate Finance
Committee further added that its reform rested "on the belief
that the highest fiduciary standards require that self-dealing not
be engaged in. 5 25 The Senate presented a statement by the
American Bar Association's Ethics Committee an example of the
highest fiduciary standard, that it is "improper for an attorney to
purchase assets from an estate or an executor or personal
representative, for whom he is acting as attorney. Any such
dealings ordinarily raise an issue as to the attorney' individual
interest as opposed to the interest of the estate or personal
representative whom he is representing as attorney. While there
may be situations in which after a full disclosure of all the facts
and with the approval of the court, it might be proper for such
purchases to be made in virtually all circumstances of this kind,
the lawyer should not subject himself to the temptation of using
for his own advantage information which he may have personally
or professionally.
,526
Congress prohibited the following transactions: (1) sale or
exchange, or leasing, of property; (2) lending of money or other
extension of credit; (3) furnishing of goods, services, or facilities;
(4) payment of compensation (or payment or reimbursement of
expenses); (5) transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a

522.
Id. at 2054.
523.
CONF. REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, at
2392; see Troyer, supra note 279, at 61 (noting that the collected excise tax goes into
general government revenues rather than set aside for I.R.S. monitoring as proposed).
524.
H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, at 1664;
1965 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 383, at 21.
525.
S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, at 2056.
526.
Id. at 2057-58.
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disqualified person of the income or assets of a private
foundation; and (6) agreement by a private foundation to make
any payment of money or other property to a government
official. 2 7 Disqualified persons included substantial contributors
to the foundation, the foundation managers, and the ancestors,
descendants, and spouses of either. 2 ' Dealing with the issue that
the loss of exemption imposed a disproportionate sanction for
Treasury to normally apply, Congress enacted a graduated tax
penalty upon both self-dealing parties to the prohibited
transaction, the disqualified self-dealer and the foundation
529
manager.
G. PrivateFoundation'sMinimum Distribution
The Congress next turned its attention toward the Treasury
Report's
recommendation
for
a minimum distribution
requirement. The Ways and Means Committee pointed out two
situations, gleamed from Treasury's analysis, that would violate
the tax subsidy / government benefit policy.53 ° Foundations,
while receiving the benefit of the charitable deduction, invested
in assets that did not necessarily create income, thus forestalling
charitable expenditure. Second, even for income producing
assets, under the current regulations, charitable expenditure
could be stalled until the accumulation became unreasonable,
and then loss of exemption offered the only penalty for ignoring
the distribution policy.
Following Treasury's recommendation, the House proposed
that a foundation be required to annually distribute its net
income.53 ' Expanding Treasury's call for a minimum distribution
527.
CONF. REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, at
2393.
528.
CONF. REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, at
2393.
The Conference Committee accepted the Senate's definition of substantial
contributor, being "any person who contributes more than $5,000 to a private foundation
if such amount is more than 2 percent of the contributions received by the foundation
before the end of the year in which the foundation receives the contribution of the person."
Id.
529.
Id. at 2394. For the disqualified self-dealer, Congress imposed a first tier 5%
tax on the amount of the prohibited transaction, followed by a 200% tax should the
transaction not be unwound. Id. For the foundation manager entering into the
prohibited transaction, a first tier tax of 2.5% subject to a maximum ten thousand dollar

amount, followed by 50% tax subject to a maximum ten thousand dollar amount. Id. at
2393-94. In order to avoid an unreasonable burden upon the foundation managers,
Congress granted them leniency to the application of the tax in that the government held
the burden of proof to show the foundation manager willful, and without reasonable
cause, violated the rule. Id.
530.
H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, at 1669.
531.
Id.; 1965 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 394, at 28-29.
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based on a foundation's non-charitable assets to curtail
foundations that invested in non-income producing assets, the
House proposed a five-percent distribution rather than three to
3 percent.532 Copying Treasury's suggestion, to qualify as part
of the minimum distribution calculation, the foundation's
expenditures must be made to public charities', private operating
foundations, direct expenditures for charitable purposes, and
expenditures for assets to be used for charitable purposes. 133
The Senate agreed with the House's proposals, but amended
two aspects which the Conference Committee accepted.534 First,
the Senate Finance Committee clarified that the excise tax,
unrelated business income tax, and reasonable administrative
expenses would be deducted in calculating the annual minimum
distribution amount.
Second, the Senate Floor increased the
minimum payout percentage to six percent of assets.
The
House and Senate agreed on a progressive tax sanction that
would ensure a foundation's compliance with the minimum
distribution rules, thus promote the government benefit policy.
Congress imposed an initial tax of fifteen percent on the nondistributed portion of the annual minimum distribution amount,
thereafter increasing the tax to one hundred percent of the nondistributed portion if the foundation did not correct its
oversight.53 7
H. PrivateFoundation'sProhibitedActivities
In addressing the taxation of sponsored activities not within
a charitable purpose, primarily political lobbying, the Senate
Finance Committee stated: "In general, the committee's decisions
reflect the concept that private foundations are stewards of
public trusts and their assets are no longer in the same status as
the assets of individuals who
may dispose of their own money in
5 38
fit."
see
they
way
lawful
any
Congress prohibited private foundations from employing
532.
H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, at 166970.
533.
Id. at 1669-70; 1965 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 383, at 26-27.
534.
CONF. REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, at
2395-96.
535.
S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, at 2063.
536.
CONF. REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, at
2395.
537.
Id. Congress set the correction period within ninety days of receiving notice of
the failure to meet the minimum distribution obligation. Id.
538.
S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, at 2075.
See Dr. Eliot's argument for exemption based on the same principle supra Part VII(C).
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funds on political lobbying and elections, grants to individuals
but for on an objective and nondiscriminatory basis, grants to
non-public
charities
unless
the
foundation
maintains
responsibility for the grants use, and for any purpose not coming
within their exempt purpose 9 Congress employed a progressive
tax sanction similar to the self-dealing rules, upon the foundation
and the foundation manager.
The foundation first pays a tax of
ten percent of the misspent amount, increasing to one hundred
percent should the foundation not undo the violation, while the
foundation manager who knowingly allowed the violation first
pays a tax of 2
percent, maximum five thousand dollars,
increasing to fifty percent, maximum ten thousand dollars if the
action remains uncorrected.5 4'
I.

Universal Reporting Requirements

Finally, Congress increased the reporting requirements on
private foundations, as well as public, non-religious, ones.542 For
all foundations, the new reporting requirements included: (1)
return the names and addresses of all substantial contributors,
directors, trustees, and other management officials, and of highly
compensated employees .'
Additionally, private foundations
reports included: (1) lists of assets showing book and marked
values; (2) lists of grants (including amounts and purposes
thereof); and (3) grantees' names. Further, Congress required
the foundations to make their required reported information
public, though non-private foundations could keep their
contributors list confidential. 4 4 Also, in order to support the
states in enforcing their charitable corporate and tax laws,
Congress directed Treasury to share information of a
foundation's violations with the relevant state.

539.
S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, at 207578; see Troyer, supra note 279, at 60; Simon, supra note 390, at 71 n.17 (noting specific
testimony that led to the various prohibited activities rules). By example, Congressman
John Rooney, New York, testified that his campaign opponent used foundation funds
under his control to make grants to churches in exchange for political speeches. Id. Also,
the Ford Foundation admitted to giving grants to Senator Robert F. Kennedy's staff to
ease the transition to the private sector. Id.
540.
CONF. REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, at
2400.
541.
Id.
542.
Id. at 2400-01.
543.
Id. at 2401.
544.
Id. The Senate Finance Committee proposed the protection of non-private
foundations donor lists because public disclosure could curtail anonymous gifts. Id.
545.
S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, at 2081.
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J.

UniversalApplicability of the UnrelatedBusiness Income
Tax

Based on the justification of inequitable treatment amongst
foundations, Congress imposed a phase in of the unrelated
business income tax rules to all exempt organizations including
religious organizations."' The House and Senate Committees
stated that some churches owned many businesses, including
...
hotels, factories, ... radio and TV stations, newspapers,
parking lots, record companies, groceries, bakeries, cleaners,
'
candy sales businesses, restaurants, etc."547
Moreover, Congress
imposed regular corporate tax upon the investment income of
social clubs and employee beneficiary associations. 54 8 The Senate
Finance Committee stated:
Since the tax exemption for social clubs and other
groups is designed to allow individuals to join
together to provide recreational or social facilities
or other benefits on a mutual basis, without tax
consequences, the tax exemption operates properly
only when the sources of income of the
organization are limited to receipts from the
membership.
Under such circumstances, the
individual is in substantially the same position as
if he had spent his income on pleasure or
recreation (or other benefits) without the
intervening separate organization.
However,
where the organization receives income from
sources outside the membership, such as income
from investments (or in the case of employee
benefit associations, from the employer), upon
which no tax is paid, the membership receives a
benefit not contemplated by the exemption in that
untaxed dollars can be used by the organization to
provide pleasure and recreation (or other benefits)
to its membership. 9
546.
Id. at 2096. Organizations caught by the new application included "churches
and conventions or associations of churches, social welfare organizations, social clubs,
fraternal beneficiary societies, employees' beneficiary organizations, teachers retirement
fund associations, benevolent life insurance associations, cemetery companies, credit
unions, mutual insurance companies, and farmers cooperatives formed to finance crop
operations." Id.
547.
Id.
548.
CONF. REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, at
2405.
549.
S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, at 2100.
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The Committee accepted the Senate's proposal to maintain
the tax exemption for amounts employed for charitable purposes
by fraternal beneficiary associations and employees beneficiary
associations.5
Finally in regard to unrelated business income,
Congress imposed tax on foundations' advertising and related
income associated with profitable activities, such as publications
and trade shows that produce a net income, but granting minor
exceptions.
K. CharitableDeduction
The Ways and Means Committee proposed increasing the
charitable deduction for non-private foundations from thirty
percent to fifty percent, but phasing out of the unlimited
deduction.
The Committee justified this deduction increase
based on maintaining a strong incentive for middle and upper
income taxpayers to contribute to charitable institutions.
However, the Committee proposed repealing the unlimited
deduction because "high-income taxpayers should be allowed to
minimize or avoid tax liability by means of the charitable
contribution deduction."5 3 The Ways and Means Committee did
550.
CONF. REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, at
2405. The Senate provided the example of fraternity and sorority organizations providing
student loans, scholarships, and leadership schools. Id.
551.
S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, at 2105.
The Senate provided an example that for a trade show's income not to be taxable, "the
activities producing the income for the association from the show - that is, the promotion,
organization and conduct of the exhibition - contribute importantly to the achievement of
the association's exempt purpose, and as a result the income is related to its exempt
purpose." Id.
552.
H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, at 1697.
The House proposed not increasing the deduction for contributed appreciated property
that would create a capital gain if sold by the taxpayer. Id. However, regarding certain
categories of property, such as appreciated art and future interests, the taxpayer is
required to accept the tax liability, the House stating:
Your committee does not believe the charitable contributions
deduction was intended to provide greater - or even nearly as great tax benefits in the case of gifts of property than would be realized if
the property were sold and the proceeds were retained by the
taxpayer. In cases where the tax saving is so large, it is not clear how
much charitable motivation actually remains. It appears that the
Government, in fact, is almost the sole contributor to the charity.

Moreover, an unwarranted benefit is allowed these taxpayers, who
usually are in the very high income brackets.
Id. at 1670.
553.
H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, at 1697.
Referencing the reason stated in the House's preamble, the Committee determined that
high taxpayers' most important deduction to avoid most or all tax was the charitable
deduction. Id. at 1697-98. The Committee gave as example that one hundred taxpayers
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not propose increasing the deduction for private foundations.
The Senate Finance Committee, agreeing with the justification
provided by the House, proposed extending the fifty percent
deduction to private operating foundations and to private
foundations that distribute the contributions with the year to
private operating foundations or public charities. 54
The
Conference Committee accepted the Senate's proposal with the
modification allowing the private foundation an extra 21/ months
after the year of contribution to distribute the funds."'
XIV. CONCLUSION

Charity is an important part of the United States economy
and social psyche. Since the turn of the century, Congress and
the states have uniformly granted tax exemption to charitable
foundations, and shortly thereafter tax deductions for charitable
donations.
However, the topsy turvy nature of how the
charitable foundation tax exemption has come to be regulated is
proof positive that America is divided on how to deal with
exemption status and charitable donations. A cursory review of
the Congressional policy and Treasury reports with regard to tax
exemptions indicates the repetitive nature of the 1850s and
1870s policy debate enunciated by James Parton and Dr. Charles
Eliot. This review also proves that, for the most part, the
charitable exemption is deserved though sometimes, by private
foundations, abused.
This is not to say that the present
regulations are correct in their assumption that private
foundations should be treated differently than others or that
private types of foundations abuse their exemption status more
than others. What should be said is that the present system may
not be as effective as it could be. Among the many debates,
reports, and testimony was evident that even "good" foundations
such as churches and schools, have abused their exempt status.
It is apparent that for the future private foundations will
continue to receive tax exemptions, though it is not certain as to
which organizations will still be considered private foundations.
with greater than one million dollars income leveraged the unlimited charitable
deduction. Id. at 1698.

554.
S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, at 2107.
The Senate also proposed extending the 50% deduction for the basis amount in
contributed property, leaving only the appreciation subject to the 30% deduction rate. Id.
555.
CONF. REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, at
2406-07. The Conference accepted the House's proposal to leave appreciated property at
the 30% deduction threshold unless the taxpayer elects to realize the appreciated amount
for tax purposes. Id.

BYRNES-MACRO

2004] PRIVATE FOUNDATION'S TOPSY TURVY ROAD

593

Based on the first hundred years, it is also apparent that this
pubic policy debate will continue to re-iterate its hundred-yearold arguments.

